Bihar: Deceptive Calm

South Asia Intelligence Review

October 22, 2007

Bibhu Prasad Routray
Silences are often discomforting, precursors to uncontrollable storms. The present state of relative tranquillity in left-wing extremism (LWE) afflicted Bihar is uneasy, as the dip in levels of violence remains neither enforced nor accompanied by a growth in the capacities of the state and its instrumentalities.
Since 2004, both LWE incidents and related fatalities in Bihar have nosedived. According to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), 172 persons were killed in 323 incidents in 2004. While incidents declined to 186 and 107 in 2005 and 2006 respectively, fatalities fell off to 107 and 51 during the corresponding period. 39 fatalities have been reported in 2007 (till October 19), according to Institute for Conflict Management data. Bihar’s share in the overall LWE related fatalities in India has, consequently, decreased from a high of 26 percent in 2004 to a mere five percent in 2006, rising marginally to eight percent in 2007.
The Police in Bihar ascribes its ‘success’ to the neutralisation of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres, including some of the outfit’s top ranking zonal and area commanders. In 2007, between January and March alone, 109 extremists, including 11 senior leaders, were arrested leading to what the police proclaimed as a "blunting of the ability to carry out subversive activities". [Estimates on armed Maoist cadres in Bihar vary between 1,000 and 2,500. In addition, there are 'hundreds' of overground workers, sympathisers and militia.] A further 15 cadres surrendered during the same period. Recently, on September 19, CPI-Maoist leader Tushar Kant Bhattacharya, chief of the outfit's ‘Triple U’ unit that operates in Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and Uttar (North) Bihar, was arrested from a rented house at Dujra locality in State capital Patna. A top ranking Naxalite (Maoist), Bhattacharya was an accused in a number of killings in the Karimnagar, Prakasam and Adilabad Districts of Andhra Pradesh between 1974 and 1980. A huge quantity of Maoist literature and explosives, as well as a pen drive and training equipment, were recovered from him.
While such achievements of the security forces are, indeed, laudable, it would be grossly premature and unwise to declare 'victory' in Bihar. The sheer and endemic lack of human development, a crumbling administrative machinery, and decaying infrastructure, have facilitated the spread of LWE in the State, which remains a critical centre for the Maoist strategic outreach. The State is a part of the group’s Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) or the projected ‘Red Corridor’ extending from Nepal, across India’s eastern board and culminating in Andhra Pradesh. Bihar, along with the Dandakaranya region and Jharkhand, also constitutes an extension of the Maoist ‘base area’, from which the strategy of the people’s war is planned, finalised and, often, executed.
The Maoist domination of vast expanses of Bihar’s territory is both well documented and officially confirmed. According to a March 2007 Bihar Police document, 30 of the State’s 38 Districts are currently affected by Maoist activities. Nine of these – Patna, Gaya, Aurangabad, Jehanabad, Arwal, Kaimur, Rohtas, Nawada and Jamui – have been designated 'hyper-sensitive'. A further nine Districts, including Bhojpur, Muzzafarpur, Sitamarhi, Motihari, Darbhanga, Saharsa, Banka, Bagaha and Sheohar, fall into the 'sensitive' category, while the remaining 12 Districts are categorised 'less sensitive'. According to the Institute for Conflict Management’s database, Maoist activities – if not Maoist violence, in 2006 and 2007 (till October 20), has been reported from 32 Districts.
The reality in Bihar, in spite of the dip in violence, is that the security forces are yet to come to grips with the character, nuances and scale of the Maoist threat, and have been repeatedly overwhelmed by 'surprise' attacks. At least six such attacks involving people’s militia have been reported in 2007 (till October 20) from Khagaria, Rohtas, Munger, Sheohar, Gaya and Jamui Districts. The very basic capacities required to contain the Maoist threat are simply absent, and the understanding of Maoist strategies, both of mobilisation and of protracted war, are severely deficient in the state Police and political leadership. The approach within the security establishment remains defensive, leaving the initiative almost entirely in Maoist hands.
This was more than evident in the effortlessness with which the Maoists implemented a ‘general strike’ across Bihar (in addition to Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh) on September 23, protesting against the arrest of their leader, Tushar Kant Bhattacharya. The strike was announced two days in advance, and subsequently involved attacks on two Police Stations, at Amas and Barachatti in the Gaya District, and the setting ablaze of fourteen vehicles, including a passenger bus in the Amas and Barachatti areas. Three persons, including one policeman, were killed in the violence. Several trains passing through the state suspended their operations fearing attacks. National highways in the Gaya, Aurangabad and Rohtas Districts were altogether deserted, as private buses and trucks stayed off the roads. The State Police Chief, incidentally, had prepared his forces to deal with the eventuality with a directive to all the Police Stations to be especially vigilant and to carry out intensive patrolling of vital installations, including railway stations and Government buildings.
LWE in India has traditionally exploited each State’s inability to dominate its geographical area and has carved out its own zones of safety. Consequently, the expansion of the State’s authority into the zones of Maoist dominance is necessary to reduce rebel capacities. This is the strategy that has brought success in Andhra Pradesh. Bihar, on the other hand, displays neither the will nor the capacities to replicate the Andhra model. Not only is Bihar’s police to population ratio a meagre 60 per 100,000 (2006 estimate) compared to the national average of 142, the State has consistently faltered in implementing schemes to improve the quality and capacities of its Forces.
A May 2006 report by the Bihar Police Association stated that the amount allocated for Police modernisation remained unspent, even as over 300 Police Stations, 92 Police pickets and over hundred town outposts located in extremist-hit Districts were without boundary walls and minimum infrastructures. The degree to which the integrity of Police functioning had been undermined was further illustrated by an affidavit filed by the Police Headquarters in the Patna High Court in May 2006, which revealed that over 740 policemen in Bihar, from constables to Superintendents, were facing criminal cases that include charges of dacoity, murder, rape and extortion.
The state of affairs has witnessed little improvement since. In September 2007, the Superintendent of Police (SP) of one LWE afflicted District was quoted as having stated, "This Government promised Police modernisation. So far nothing has been done. Police Stations continue to be in miserable shape and our jawans continue to live in sub-human conditions. How can you goad them to fight criminals with courage?" The Bihar Government is yet to provide bullet-proof vehicles, high-frequency wireless sets, night-vision devices and anti-landmine vehicles to Police personnel in the LWE affected Districts. Similarly, the number of personnel to have completed the "anti-extremist tactics course" designed to fight LWE remains miniscule. The quality of arms available with Police personnel is yet to achieve a level of satisfactory sophistication, compared to those available with the Maoist cadres.
Worse still, the neglect of its Police personnel by the State administration appears to be systemic, and is an overt and misguided prejudice in favour of interventions by the central para-military forces (CPMFs) and the military. Intermittent Maoist attacks have thus been followed by the usual demands for more CPMF companies, over and above the 23 companies presently deployed. Additionally, since April 2006, Bihar, in a bid to tide over its dependence on the CPMFs and to fill up the void of trained personnel, raised the 5000-strong State Auxiliary Police (SAP), comprising retired Army personnel to contain Maoist violence, and has deployed them in sensitive Districts. The SAP, widely considered the brainchild of Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, has since expanded to include another 11,500 personnel.
While the injection of this significant number of retired military personnel has secured some initial success against the Maoists, it’s promise against the rebels’ strategy of mobilisation and warfare is limited. It is understood that the Maoists defined their strategy of response during a three-day meeting, between September 29 and October 1, 2007, in the Malkangiri District of Orissa, and this is to rely increasingly on ‘lightening strikes’ directed against the Police and Government establishments. There are further indications that the Maoists are engaged in a massive effort of mass mobilisation and recruitment in reaction to the limited and transient depletion of cadres and in the leadership.
The Andhra Pradesh success against LWE has demonstrated, in no uncertain terms, that it is possible to defeat LWE violence by augmenting the capacities of the State Police Force, and by aggressive operations in Maoist dominated territories. Such measures, when accompanied by some efficiency of administration, fund utilisation and implementation of development projects in LWE affected areas, delivers enduring blows against extremist capacities. In contrast, Bihar has consistently faltered both in creating Force capacities and in carrying out basic administrative and developmental activities. Notwithstanding brief interludes of relative tranquillity, it does not seem likely that the Maoist advances will be significantly or permanently reversed in this State, unless there are fundamental changes in both counter-insurgent strategy and governance.