Manipur continues to be affected by the activities of a large number of militant/insurgent outfits divided on ethnic lines with competing demands. Keeping the situation in view, sustained counter insurgency operations have been mounted in close coordination between the State Government and the Central security forces/agencies. As a result, the number of militants/ insurgents killed or arrested has gone up significantly during the year.
– Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual report 2007-08
The MHA assessment of the state of militancy clearly seeks to underplay the realities of the ground situation. Year after year, the state of militancy in Manipur has displayed all the characteristics of intractability. With 408 deaths in the year 2007, Manipur remained the second most conflict ridden State in the northeast (behind Assam with 437 fatalities) according to Institute for Conflict Management data; in year 2008 (till April 28), with 162 fatalities the State had even surpassed the most conflict prone Jammu and Kashmir (153 fatalities) and to become the most violent theatre of conflict in the country. Irrespective of whether the current level of violence is sustained through the year, the state of affairs points to a scenario of all-pervasive hopelessness in Manipur. While the MHA can continue to live in a make-believe world of imagined gratification, it is clear that more than two decades of counter-insurgency operations in Manipur continue to be marked by serious shortcomings.
All the nine Districts of the state including both the Valley (four Districts) and the Hill areas (five Districts) have remained affected, not just by militant activities, but by unrelenting violence, reported from every one of the 59 Police Stations in the State. The unending militant violence has severely impacted on the very limited local capacities for governance, justice administration, and the provision of minimal security to citizens. Militants have not only extorted and abducted with impunity, but have also imposed diktats on issues ranging from food, dress, language, cultural and religious practices, education etc., most of which have been complied with by the hapless population. The militant influence has not been confined to the remote corners of the State, but is on full display in the ‘fortified’ State capital, Imphal, with attacks on the residences of ministers and Members of the State Legislative Assembly (MLAs). On March 8, 2008, for instance, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) militants drove up to the heavily guarded Manipur Assembly complex and lobbed a bomb that exploded without causing any fatalities. Again, on April 24, at least five persons, including a woman, were injured when a remote controlled improvised explosive device (IED) fitted on a scooter was exploded by the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) at the Babupara VIP colony near the Chief Minister's bungalow in capital Imphal.
The capacities of about 15 active militant outfits with an estimated cadre-strength of 10,000 remain rooted in factors such as support from civilians and the intelligentsia, a highly efficient intelligence network, hideouts in neighbouring Myanmar and arms supply from South-east Asia. The relentless hostility between the Hills inhabited by the tribals and the Valley dominated by the Hindu Meitei population, has acted as an enormous force multiplier for the extremist groups. More or less sustained counter-insurgency operations, for over two-decades, have had very little impact on the capacities of the militant outfits.
In January 2008, the Army authorities claimed to have dislodged the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the most potent outfit primarily active in the Valley areas, from its last bastion inside the State, the New Samtal area spread over 1,000 square kilometres in the south-western Chandel District. The claims followed the usual rigmarole involving visits by various Army officials and the Governor of the State, who made assurances that civil administration would soon be restored in the area. Coming after nearly one and half years’ of intermittent campaigns to end militant control over the area, the restoration of security force (SF) dominance in New Samtal was hailed as a decisive blow to UNLF capacities, with promises that these would be further diminished in the following months.
Within three months, however, the gains appear to be dissipating. Far from a restoration of civil administration in the area, what has actually occurred is that UNLF cadres, who had simply vacated the villages and retreated into the forest areas, or had crossed over into the safety of adjoining Myanmar, in the wake of security force operations, are now returning to the area, and have already managed ambushes on the security force contingents on two occasions. On May 1, 2008, the UNLF’s ‘293 battalion’ carried out two attacks on the para-military Assam Rifles (AR) personnel. At least two AR personnel were killed and four others injured as a result of the attack on three AR water collection vehicles at Phairengkot village. The second attack on an AR post at Molcham did not result in any casualty.
Although both Police and the Army sources in Manipur insist that the coordination between various security agencies is smooth and trouble free, there are several points of friction. Acute differences between the Police and the Army have a history of at least four years. Beginning with the July 2004 Manorama Devi episode, assessments of militancy by the Army and the Police have diverged markedly. In fact, the State Government’s decision to withdraw the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) from the Imphal municipal areas was reached at the behest of the Police, despite stiff opposition from the Army. Subsequently, the Police refused to abide by the Army’s October 2005 Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki militant groups, and continued to target Kuki militants under the ceasefire. The 2004 establishment of a ‘Unified Command Structure’ notwithstanding, frequent ‘ego clashes’ between the Army and the Police are said to have hampered the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations. The Army has been accused of refusing to take orders from the Police during joint operations. Similarly, the Army complains of receiving very little support from the Police, especially during its operations in the Hill Districts. Police operations against the militants have remained mostly confined to the Valley.
Successes in counter-insurgency campaigns in conflict theatres in the country, including Punjab and more recent successes in Tripura, Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh, have underlined the crucial role of the State Police. While the Army and the central para-military forces (CPMFs) can play a supportive role, counter-insurgency operations need to be substantially Police-led, if they are to succeed. Unfortunately, the Police in Manipur have historically abdicated responsibility, leaving the Army and the CPMFs to lead from the front, resulting in numerous tactical successes, but enveloping strategic failure.
The MHA’s Police modernization programme has been under implementation in Manipur since 1969 and the programme aims at capacity building among the state Police force, especially to meet internal security challenges. Manipur has been classified as an ‘A’ category State under the programme and receives 100 per cent central assistance for Police modernization. Over the years, however, utilisation of the available central funds remains extremely poor. Accessible data indicates that the State spent 80 per cent of the INR 152.4 million in central funds released for 2004-05. However, utilization in the previous five years never exceeded 43 per cent. The release of the central funds has also been affected by the failure of the Police Department to submit projects.
Worse, the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) report on the Manipur Home Department for 2006-07 is a poor commentary on Police affairs in the State. The CAG audit found:
1) Shortfall of arms and ammunitions ranged from 17 to 100 per cent and from 37 to 95 per cent respectively, which hindered the capacity of the force to combat militancy.
2) There was 30 to 51 per cent shortage of vehicles, adversely impacting on the mobility of the Force.
3) There was 82 per cent vacancy in respect of technical posts in the forensic laboratory resulting in 73 to 82 per cent cases lying pending during 2002-07.
4) Although the Manipur Police Housing Corporation had spent only INR 70.2 million up to March 2007 out of INR 189.7 million placed (2002-07) at its disposal for construction of Police Stations, buildings and barracks, the Department had shown the entire amount as expenditure.
There is an acute shortage of residential buildings for Police personnel and the ‘satisfaction level’, as of March 2007, was only 11 per cent.
5) The objective of sharing/disseminating information with other Police organisations/CPMFs through the POLNET (the Satellite-based all India Police Telecommunication Network) system had not been achieved, despite an expenditure of INR 26.3 million.
The capacities of the Manipur Police have also been diminished as a result of a manpower shortfall in the force. In spite of the fact that Manipur has a fairly healthy Police-population ratio (Police personnel per 100,000 population) of 554 (the national average is 126) and Police density (Policemen per 100 square kilometre area) of 63.8 (national average is 44.4), the 17,708 strong Police force (sanctioned strength) suffers from a vacancy of 19.52 per cent. While the vacancy among the civil Police force component is a bearable 12 per cent, among the armed Police component it is over 20.68 per cent. Leadership Deficits are worse, and National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data indicates that vacancies among the armed Police are almost 69 per cent at the levels of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP)/ Superintendent of Police (SP)/ Additional SP/ Assistant SP/ Deputy SP; 25 per cent at the Inspector/ Sub-Inspector (SI) and Assistant SI (ASI) levels; and 20 per cent among the personnel in the ‘below ASI rank’ category [All data as of December 31, 2006]. Between 2002 and 2005, Manipur recruited just 823 constables and 10 sub-inspectors and assistant sub-inspectors. The bulk of the constable’s appointments (821 out of 823) were in 2005. Currently, the process of recruitment to SI an ASI posts is ongoing, and it will be a while before the new recruits are trained and assigned postings.
The failure of the Police to provide minimum security to civilians has resulted in some desperate moves recently. On May 2, 2008, the State Cabinet approved a plan to recruit 500 special Police officers (SPOs) and to arm them with .303 rifles to provide security against the militants in Heirok village of Thoubal District and Chajing village of Imphal West District. As per the plan, each of these SPOs would be provided with a monthly remuneration of INR 3,000 and would be required to stay at barracks to be constructed near these villages. The deployment will follow a month’s training in the use of arms.
In Manipur, the Village Voluntary Force (VVF) had played an effective role of resisting militant advances, notably that of the Naga National Council (NNC) during the 1960s and 1970s, in areas such as Ukhrul and Tamenglong. Many of these VVF cadres were later absorbed into the para-military Special Services Bureau (SSB), which was rechristened as Sasashtra Seema Bal (SSB) in 2007. However, the current move to appoint SPOs to checkmate the militants appears abrupt and was mostly influenced by appeals for arms by villagers of Heirok and Chanjing after two incidents of militant attacks on March 24 and April 23, which resulted in the killing of four persons. It is not clear what sort of resistance these ill-trained villagers with archaic arms would be able to put up against vastly superior militant cadres, nor is it clear whether this force would operate under Police or other SF command. It is also possible that the initial euphoria around the exploitation of a transient antipathy against militancy will die out, once the militants start eliminating these ‘sitting ducks’ and decamp with their weapons. The state’s agencies have been trying to provoke and spread popular discontent against militancy, but passing the responsibility of providing security to the villagers, unquestionably a function of the state, on to civilians is fraught with inherent dangers.
Sagacity does not appear to mark much of the State Government’s perspectives on counter-insurgency. On March 30, Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, responding to the allegations of staged encounter killings, declared that the militants in the state must die for Manipur to be saved. "The Government is being criticised for killing militants. But we have little choice but to kill them to protect lives and property", Singh retorted. While the strategy is debatable, the fact remains that the security force setup, especially the Police force, appear to be entirely unable to neutralise the militancy. Unless there is a near-miraculous reinvention of the capacities and orientation of the Police Force in the proximate future, Manipur’s tryst with anarchy appears to be interminable.
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