Bibhu Prasad Routray
South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol.7, No. 17, November 3, 2008
In the biggest ever strike in Assam’s long history of terrorism, on October 30, 2008, 81 persons were killed and over 350 injured, in nine near-simultaneous explosions that went off within a span of one hour in four Districts in the western part of the State, including state capital Dispur and conjoined Guwahati. As many as 45 deaths were reported from Dispur-Guwahati alone, where at least three explosions occurred in crowded places including markets and the District Courts complex. The western-most District of Kokrajhar accounted for 21 deaths in another three explosions and the Barpeta District witnessed two explosions resulting in the death of 15 persons. In the District Headquarters of Bongaigaon, 11 persons, including two civilians and nine Security Force (SF) personnel from the Police and the Army were injured in a single explosion, as they tried moving a motorcycle strapped with explosives to a safer location. The overall death toll is most likely to rise further, as at least 30 of the injured are said to be in critical condition.
All the explosions targeted the State and District headquarters and were set off at crowded public places – including popular markets, courts and Police Stations – with an apparent intention of maximising civilian fatalities. In Dispur-Guwahati, small cars laden with explosives were left in markets, while in the other towns, explosives were planted on motorcycles and bicycles. Forensic examination has confirmed that RDX and ammonium nitrate were used in at least two of the three explosions that rocked Dispur-Guwahati. By all accounts all the explosions were sophisticated, of a high intensity, and were the outcome of meticulous planning and substantial financial resources.
Within hours of the blasts, Assam’s most potent terrorist outfit, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) sent e-mail messages to the newspaper offices in Guwahati denying any role in the blasts. Signed by Aanjan Borthakur of the group's ‘central publicity unit’, the statement offered its deep condolences to the family members of those killed, and wished for the speedy recovery of the injured. The message blamed the Indian ‘occupational forces’ for the explosions, which it said were directed at "derailing the peace process". It is customary for ULFA to send out such denials and claims, especially when attacks claim lives of civilians. Significantly, no ‘peace process’ between ULFA and the Government is currently underway.
On October 31, about 30 hours after the explosions, a Guwahati-based private TV news channel reported that they have received a text message in which the ‘Islamic Security Force – Indian Muzahideen’ (ISF-IM) has claimed responsibility for the serial blasts. The message read, "We ISF-IM take the responsibility of yesterday’s blast. We warn all of Assam and India of situations like this in future. We thank all our holy members and partners. Ameen." The mobile number (9864693690) used to send the message was later traced to the Morigaon District, adjoining the Kamrup District where State capital Dispur is situated. A group called the Islamic Security Force of India (ISFI) was founded almost one and half decades ago and had perished without recording a single action worth note, and no prior information is available on any derivative of this group answering to the title of ISF-IM. The Assam Police has, however, claimed that the ISF-IM was, indeed, floated in the year 2000 in western Assam, basically to confront Bodo militancy.
Immediately after the explosions, a Cabinet Minister in Assam went on record saying that he suspects the role of the ULFA in the attack, an assumption that was, however, rather quickly challenged by others in the State establishment. The denial by ULFA appeared to have convinced even the Assam Police Intelligence chief, Khagen Sarma, who declared, "The needle of suspicion points to jihadi outfits who are behind subversive activities in the State… While investigations will go on, the Police have been zeroing in on Islamist fundamentalist forces which, of late, have been active in the State and the region."
Sarma was not alone. ‘ULFA can’t do this’–theories found ready takers among many analysts who extended their arc of understanding to blame the illegal migrants from Bangladesh and the Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami (HuJI), which has been accused of orchestrating several terror strikes in urban centres across India, thought there is little evidence of their past activities or potency in the Northeast. Curious explanations exonerating ULFA and displaying a gross lack of understanding of the outfit’s activities over the past three decades and its present capacities, included phrases such as ‘attacks don’t suit ULFA’s interests’, ‘ULFA is much weaker now’, ‘ULFA does not attack civilians’ and/or combinations of these. Experts appearing on the televisions channels were also at great pains to explain how ‘a new group of ULFA’, ‘ULFA group based in China’, ‘HuJI and Jamaat’, ‘Bangladeshi migrants’, ‘external forces’ and even some ‘Bodo tribal groups’ who had been involved in the October clashes in two of Assam’s Districts, could also have played a role in the explosions. Organisations like the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP) organised rallies condemning jihadi and fundamentalist forces.
As with terrorist attacks in the past, it is doubtful that a final and credible determination of responsibility will ever be made – Police investigations and declarations notwithstanding. Worse, the current proclivity to carrying out processes of investigation under the glare of the media severely undermines the already deficient credibility of state agencies, as every line of investigation, partial determination of fact, lead and, indeed, at least some wildly speculative nonsense, is reported as the ‘solution’ of the case. The sheer incoherence that is projected at this stage undermines the integrity of the investigative process and, in substantial measure, the sustainability of any prosecution that may eventually be launched.
It must be clear that investigations are, at this juncture, at no more than a preliminary stage. Five persons have been detained in connection with the investigations, but this has no definitive implications regarding culpability. Among these, Nazir Ahmed was arrested from Moirabari in eastern Assam's Morigaon District. It was Ahmed’s mobile phone that was used to send an SMS to a local television channel claiming the serial blasts as an operation executed by the ISF-IM. The mobile phone had reportedly been acquired on the basis of false identity documents. The owners of one of the cars and of a motorcycle used in the serial blasts were also arrested, but reports suggest that these vehicles had not been in their possession for some time. Two further arrests are also related to the acquisition of vehicles for the serial attack. A forensic examination of the explosives used suggests that a mix of RDX and ammonium nitrate variously involved in the blasts, which were triggered by timer devices. That, roughly, is all that lies in the present realm of ‘facts’ in this case.
A large body of precedent information, however, does provide a credible basis for an informed assessment of groups that have the capacity and intent to execute an operation reflecting the coordination and magnitude of the October 30 attacks. One thing is certain in this context: ULFA does not lie outside the circle of suspicion.
Contrary to several media reports suggesting that the October 30 attacks were the first instance of serial explosions in the State, ULFA had organised a chain of seven explosions across five Districts (Kokrajhar, Goalpara, Darrang, Tinsukia and Kamrup) on August 26, 2004, which left five persons dead and over 100 injured. As on the present occasion, ULFA had issued a note of denial at that time as well. More recently, ULFA is believed to have lent its hand in the serial explosions that rocked Agartala, State capital of neighbouring Tripura, on October 1, 2008, which injured over 70 persons. HuJI had emerged as the primary suspect immediately after the blasts, but subsequent investigations revealed that ULFA cadres in Bangladesh had trained All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) militants to carry out the explosions.
ULFA has been involved in numerous explosions in Assam since the very inception of the group. Indeed, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and grenades have been established as the dominant mode of attack by ULFA cadres. With a visible decline in its numerical strength, ULFA has, since 2005, also resorted to employing mercenaries for planting explosives in crowded places. The outfit has used sophisticated explosives like the RDX in a number of its attacks and is also known to have a sizeable stock of TNT (Trinitrotoluene) and a variety of plastic explosives, stored mostly in the Bangladesh, along India’s international border. ULFA has used explosive laden bicycles, motorcycles and cars to set off blasts on previous occasions. The first instance of a car bomb explosion set off by ULFA was on February 4, 2007, near the Pan Bazaar Police Station in Guwahati. In January 2008, two ULFA cadres responsible for the attack were arrested by the Assam Police. A sizeable majority of ULFA’s terror attacks have been directed against civilian targets, in complete contravention to the claims of the outfit and its overground advocates.
Significantly, all the four Districts that were chosen for the serial attacks on October 30 are known ULFA strongholds. Moreover, almost all the locations where explosives were detonated, including the specific locations in Dispur-Guwahati, barring the High Court premises, have been targeted by ULFA in the past. The Ganeshguri flyover, in the proximity of the State Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat, has been the scene of at least 30 explosions, in the past five years. Portions of the space below the flyover are used as a parking area for cars and two wheelers, as well as by street hawkers, and are an easy location to plant a car bomb.
Too much emphasis has been placed on the present debility of ULFA to argue that the outfit, being at its weakest since its inception, is operationally incapable of carrying out an attack at this scale, particularly after the defection and surrender of two companies of its principal strike force, the ‘28th battalion’ (one of the three active military formations of the outfit). While it is certainly the case that the ‘28th battalion’s’ defection and engagement with the Government has impacted significantly on ULFA’s capacities, it remains the case that other formations, including the ‘27th battalion’ [active in the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar (NC) Hills District] and the ‘709th battalion’ (active in the western Assam Districts), are almost intact. Crucially, the weakness of the ‘28th battalion’ has led to a significant reduction of the outfit’s activities in the eastern-most (Upper Assam) Districts of the State. But, no visible decline in the capacities of the other two battalions has been noticed. The ‘27th battalion’s’ activities have primarily remained confined to the hill Districts of Karbi Anglong and NC Hills and this formation is not known to have carried out any attacks in Dispur-Guwahati or any of the other locations which witnessed explosions on October 30. On the other hand, the ‘709th battalion’ has, in the past, has executed past operations both in Dispur-Guwahati as well as in the Districts of Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon and Barpeta, where the recent serial explosions occurred. It is, thus, possible that the 709th battalion, which operates with steady support from Bangladesh where the top ULFA leadership is based, was the primary executing agency behind the present serial blasts, which have been concentrated significantly in its areas of operation. A major strike was, moreover, almost a dire necessity for ULFA, to demonstrate its surviving capacities in the eyes of both sympathisers and detractors, who are increasingly inclined to write the outfit off.
The finger of suspicion has also been directed at the role of the Bangladesh-based HuJI, which does share operational linkages with the ULFA (despite vociferous denials by the latter). HuJI, in the past, has managed several of ULFA’s training camps located in Bangladesh, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), where cadres of both outfits have trained together. Intelligence sources in July 2008 have indicated that both outfits have reached an agreement to operate jointly in Assam. Both ULFA and the HuJI have remained closely linked to the Bangladeshi Directorate of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). However, while HuJI has been a common factor in many of the terror attacks in urban centres across India, its activities in Assam or across the Northeast have been negligible. A HuJI presence in Assam has, of course, been noticed in the recent past. Seven HuJI cadres were killed in the Dhubri District on September 26, and another two in Goalpara District on October 16, while entering Assam. The group has often used Assam’s porous borders with Bangladesh to gain entry into India, but there is little to suggest that it has the capacities to execute an operation of the magnitude of the October 30 attacks without significant local support. Lacking its own networks, it would need to rely on an existing local group with sufficient understanding and penetration of the target areas.
The Special Investigation Team (SIT) set up by the State Government is presently exploring the possibility of a HuJI-ULFA link in the serial blasts, even as it examines the authenticity of the SMS claiming responsibility of the ISF-IM. Since this serial attack occurred in India’s perennially troubled and neglected Northeast, its impression is already receding in the national (read, Delhi’s) consciousness. Routine statements of sympathy with the victims and determination to ‘fight terrorism’ have, of course, been issued by suitable authorities on Raisina Hill, and Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, on October 31, promised that "stern action" would be taken against those involved in the serial blasts. It is useful, however, to recall that, just two days before the serial blasts, officials of the Assam Home Department, which is headed by Chief Minister Gogoi, were pleading with the Union Government to go soft on the ULFA and end Army operations so that more ULFA cadres could be brought into the ‘peace process’. As the dust settles further, Assam will, inevitably, revert to ‘politics as usual’. The October 30 bombings – the largest in Assam’s history, no doubt – are only the latest in an unending chain of terrorist attacks under a succession of inept administrations that have vacillated, deceived, politicized and undermined responses, but consistently failed to define and execute a coherent strategy to neutralize this unrelenting threat.
All the explosions targeted the State and District headquarters and were set off at crowded public places – including popular markets, courts and Police Stations – with an apparent intention of maximising civilian fatalities. In Dispur-Guwahati, small cars laden with explosives were left in markets, while in the other towns, explosives were planted on motorcycles and bicycles. Forensic examination has confirmed that RDX and ammonium nitrate were used in at least two of the three explosions that rocked Dispur-Guwahati. By all accounts all the explosions were sophisticated, of a high intensity, and were the outcome of meticulous planning and substantial financial resources.
Within hours of the blasts, Assam’s most potent terrorist outfit, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) sent e-mail messages to the newspaper offices in Guwahati denying any role in the blasts. Signed by Aanjan Borthakur of the group's ‘central publicity unit’, the statement offered its deep condolences to the family members of those killed, and wished for the speedy recovery of the injured. The message blamed the Indian ‘occupational forces’ for the explosions, which it said were directed at "derailing the peace process". It is customary for ULFA to send out such denials and claims, especially when attacks claim lives of civilians. Significantly, no ‘peace process’ between ULFA and the Government is currently underway.
On October 31, about 30 hours after the explosions, a Guwahati-based private TV news channel reported that they have received a text message in which the ‘Islamic Security Force – Indian Muzahideen’ (ISF-IM) has claimed responsibility for the serial blasts. The message read, "We ISF-IM take the responsibility of yesterday’s blast. We warn all of Assam and India of situations like this in future. We thank all our holy members and partners. Ameen." The mobile number (9864693690) used to send the message was later traced to the Morigaon District, adjoining the Kamrup District where State capital Dispur is situated. A group called the Islamic Security Force of India (ISFI) was founded almost one and half decades ago and had perished without recording a single action worth note, and no prior information is available on any derivative of this group answering to the title of ISF-IM. The Assam Police has, however, claimed that the ISF-IM was, indeed, floated in the year 2000 in western Assam, basically to confront Bodo militancy.
Immediately after the explosions, a Cabinet Minister in Assam went on record saying that he suspects the role of the ULFA in the attack, an assumption that was, however, rather quickly challenged by others in the State establishment. The denial by ULFA appeared to have convinced even the Assam Police Intelligence chief, Khagen Sarma, who declared, "The needle of suspicion points to jihadi outfits who are behind subversive activities in the State… While investigations will go on, the Police have been zeroing in on Islamist fundamentalist forces which, of late, have been active in the State and the region."
Sarma was not alone. ‘ULFA can’t do this’–theories found ready takers among many analysts who extended their arc of understanding to blame the illegal migrants from Bangladesh and the Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami (HuJI), which has been accused of orchestrating several terror strikes in urban centres across India, thought there is little evidence of their past activities or potency in the Northeast. Curious explanations exonerating ULFA and displaying a gross lack of understanding of the outfit’s activities over the past three decades and its present capacities, included phrases such as ‘attacks don’t suit ULFA’s interests’, ‘ULFA is much weaker now’, ‘ULFA does not attack civilians’ and/or combinations of these. Experts appearing on the televisions channels were also at great pains to explain how ‘a new group of ULFA’, ‘ULFA group based in China’, ‘HuJI and Jamaat’, ‘Bangladeshi migrants’, ‘external forces’ and even some ‘Bodo tribal groups’ who had been involved in the October clashes in two of Assam’s Districts, could also have played a role in the explosions. Organisations like the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP) organised rallies condemning jihadi and fundamentalist forces.
As with terrorist attacks in the past, it is doubtful that a final and credible determination of responsibility will ever be made – Police investigations and declarations notwithstanding. Worse, the current proclivity to carrying out processes of investigation under the glare of the media severely undermines the already deficient credibility of state agencies, as every line of investigation, partial determination of fact, lead and, indeed, at least some wildly speculative nonsense, is reported as the ‘solution’ of the case. The sheer incoherence that is projected at this stage undermines the integrity of the investigative process and, in substantial measure, the sustainability of any prosecution that may eventually be launched.
It must be clear that investigations are, at this juncture, at no more than a preliminary stage. Five persons have been detained in connection with the investigations, but this has no definitive implications regarding culpability. Among these, Nazir Ahmed was arrested from Moirabari in eastern Assam's Morigaon District. It was Ahmed’s mobile phone that was used to send an SMS to a local television channel claiming the serial blasts as an operation executed by the ISF-IM. The mobile phone had reportedly been acquired on the basis of false identity documents. The owners of one of the cars and of a motorcycle used in the serial blasts were also arrested, but reports suggest that these vehicles had not been in their possession for some time. Two further arrests are also related to the acquisition of vehicles for the serial attack. A forensic examination of the explosives used suggests that a mix of RDX and ammonium nitrate variously involved in the blasts, which were triggered by timer devices. That, roughly, is all that lies in the present realm of ‘facts’ in this case.
A large body of precedent information, however, does provide a credible basis for an informed assessment of groups that have the capacity and intent to execute an operation reflecting the coordination and magnitude of the October 30 attacks. One thing is certain in this context: ULFA does not lie outside the circle of suspicion.
Contrary to several media reports suggesting that the October 30 attacks were the first instance of serial explosions in the State, ULFA had organised a chain of seven explosions across five Districts (Kokrajhar, Goalpara, Darrang, Tinsukia and Kamrup) on August 26, 2004, which left five persons dead and over 100 injured. As on the present occasion, ULFA had issued a note of denial at that time as well. More recently, ULFA is believed to have lent its hand in the serial explosions that rocked Agartala, State capital of neighbouring Tripura, on October 1, 2008, which injured over 70 persons. HuJI had emerged as the primary suspect immediately after the blasts, but subsequent investigations revealed that ULFA cadres in Bangladesh had trained All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) militants to carry out the explosions.
ULFA has been involved in numerous explosions in Assam since the very inception of the group. Indeed, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and grenades have been established as the dominant mode of attack by ULFA cadres. With a visible decline in its numerical strength, ULFA has, since 2005, also resorted to employing mercenaries for planting explosives in crowded places. The outfit has used sophisticated explosives like the RDX in a number of its attacks and is also known to have a sizeable stock of TNT (Trinitrotoluene) and a variety of plastic explosives, stored mostly in the Bangladesh, along India’s international border. ULFA has used explosive laden bicycles, motorcycles and cars to set off blasts on previous occasions. The first instance of a car bomb explosion set off by ULFA was on February 4, 2007, near the Pan Bazaar Police Station in Guwahati. In January 2008, two ULFA cadres responsible for the attack were arrested by the Assam Police. A sizeable majority of ULFA’s terror attacks have been directed against civilian targets, in complete contravention to the claims of the outfit and its overground advocates.
Significantly, all the four Districts that were chosen for the serial attacks on October 30 are known ULFA strongholds. Moreover, almost all the locations where explosives were detonated, including the specific locations in Dispur-Guwahati, barring the High Court premises, have been targeted by ULFA in the past. The Ganeshguri flyover, in the proximity of the State Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat, has been the scene of at least 30 explosions, in the past five years. Portions of the space below the flyover are used as a parking area for cars and two wheelers, as well as by street hawkers, and are an easy location to plant a car bomb.
Too much emphasis has been placed on the present debility of ULFA to argue that the outfit, being at its weakest since its inception, is operationally incapable of carrying out an attack at this scale, particularly after the defection and surrender of two companies of its principal strike force, the ‘28th battalion’ (one of the three active military formations of the outfit). While it is certainly the case that the ‘28th battalion’s’ defection and engagement with the Government has impacted significantly on ULFA’s capacities, it remains the case that other formations, including the ‘27th battalion’ [active in the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar (NC) Hills District] and the ‘709th battalion’ (active in the western Assam Districts), are almost intact. Crucially, the weakness of the ‘28th battalion’ has led to a significant reduction of the outfit’s activities in the eastern-most (Upper Assam) Districts of the State. But, no visible decline in the capacities of the other two battalions has been noticed. The ‘27th battalion’s’ activities have primarily remained confined to the hill Districts of Karbi Anglong and NC Hills and this formation is not known to have carried out any attacks in Dispur-Guwahati or any of the other locations which witnessed explosions on October 30. On the other hand, the ‘709th battalion’ has, in the past, has executed past operations both in Dispur-Guwahati as well as in the Districts of Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon and Barpeta, where the recent serial explosions occurred. It is, thus, possible that the 709th battalion, which operates with steady support from Bangladesh where the top ULFA leadership is based, was the primary executing agency behind the present serial blasts, which have been concentrated significantly in its areas of operation. A major strike was, moreover, almost a dire necessity for ULFA, to demonstrate its surviving capacities in the eyes of both sympathisers and detractors, who are increasingly inclined to write the outfit off.
The finger of suspicion has also been directed at the role of the Bangladesh-based HuJI, which does share operational linkages with the ULFA (despite vociferous denials by the latter). HuJI, in the past, has managed several of ULFA’s training camps located in Bangladesh, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), where cadres of both outfits have trained together. Intelligence sources in July 2008 have indicated that both outfits have reached an agreement to operate jointly in Assam. Both ULFA and the HuJI have remained closely linked to the Bangladeshi Directorate of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). However, while HuJI has been a common factor in many of the terror attacks in urban centres across India, its activities in Assam or across the Northeast have been negligible. A HuJI presence in Assam has, of course, been noticed in the recent past. Seven HuJI cadres were killed in the Dhubri District on September 26, and another two in Goalpara District on October 16, while entering Assam. The group has often used Assam’s porous borders with Bangladesh to gain entry into India, but there is little to suggest that it has the capacities to execute an operation of the magnitude of the October 30 attacks without significant local support. Lacking its own networks, it would need to rely on an existing local group with sufficient understanding and penetration of the target areas.
The Special Investigation Team (SIT) set up by the State Government is presently exploring the possibility of a HuJI-ULFA link in the serial blasts, even as it examines the authenticity of the SMS claiming responsibility of the ISF-IM. Since this serial attack occurred in India’s perennially troubled and neglected Northeast, its impression is already receding in the national (read, Delhi’s) consciousness. Routine statements of sympathy with the victims and determination to ‘fight terrorism’ have, of course, been issued by suitable authorities on Raisina Hill, and Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, on October 31, promised that "stern action" would be taken against those involved in the serial blasts. It is useful, however, to recall that, just two days before the serial blasts, officials of the Assam Home Department, which is headed by Chief Minister Gogoi, were pleading with the Union Government to go soft on the ULFA and end Army operations so that more ULFA cadres could be brought into the ‘peace process’. As the dust settles further, Assam will, inevitably, revert to ‘politics as usual’. The October 30 bombings – the largest in Assam’s history, no doubt – are only the latest in an unending chain of terrorist attacks under a succession of inept administrations that have vacillated, deceived, politicized and undermined responses, but consistently failed to define and execute a coherent strategy to neutralize this unrelenting threat.
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