Is there such a thing as a ‘good’ Pakistani Taliban? Or is a murderer a murderer?

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Al Arabiya News, 5 July 2011

Within the last two weeks, two important developments -- a defection and a killing -- have taken place within the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), more popular by its colloquial name, the Pakistani Taliban. These incidents have a significantly weakening impact on the movement, which is responsible for some 4,500 deaths in Pakistan since its 2007 formation.

Reports indicate that more and more TTP commanders are switching sides to become “Good (Afghan) Taliban,” which in the long run is bound to have some impact on the TTP’s capacity to carry out its violent campaign within Pakistan. On the other hand, the enforcement of the Good (Afghan) Taliban, which exclusively focuses on Afghanistan for its violence, does not augur well for the latter.

In the second half of June 2011, a 39-year old TTP commander Fazal Saeed Utezai (also referred to as Fazal Saeed Haqqani), dropped out of the movement indicating his opposition to the outfit’s continued use of suicide attackers against civilians, market areas and mosques. In a media interview, Saeed lamented, “Islam does not allow killings of innocent civilians in suicide attacks.” He compared what TTP does in Pakistan to “what US troops are doing in Afghanistan.”

Saeed, with significant influence in the lower Kurram tribal agency, adjoining North Waziristan, defected with “hundreds of supporters” and went on to form his own splinter group, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Islami Pakistan. He has since asserted that his fight against the Americans would continue, but has not specified whether Pakistani state continues to remain an enemy for him. Indications are that he has switched sides from the TTP to become a part or ally of the Haqqani network, an affiliate of the Afghan Taliban, which has extended its influence into the Kurram agency.

Saeed’s defection considerably weakens the TTP, while swelling the ranks of the pro-Pakistan government Afghan Taliban, which already has militant leaders like Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan and Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan. This group opposes attacks on the Pakistani security forces and civilian targets. TTP has since criticised Saeed for having sold himself to the Pakistani state.

The second important incident was the 27 June assassination of senior commander Shakirullah Shakir, the head of the TTP’s suicide bombing squad. Unidentified gunmen killed Shakir near Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan, as he rode a motorcycle. Bullets were sprayed on him from a vehicle with tinted windows.

Shakir served as a close aide of Qari Hussain, TTP’s trainer of suicide bombers. Serving as the outfit’s spokesperson for sometime, Shakir had claimed that his outfit has trained more than 1000 suicide bombers in North Waziristan. In May this year, Shakir had issued a statement threatening Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry with “dire consequences” if he accepted the conviction of the TTP activists who were awarded death sentence by the Lahore High Court for attacking former president Pervez Musharraf. Shakir’s death is a definite blow to the TTP and it is likely to impact the suicide campaign of the TTP against the Pakistani state.

Experts believe that TTP’s current strength has dwindled since the August 2009 killing of its commander Baitullah Mehsud in a US drone attack. Since then, under the new chief Hakimullah Mehsud, who served as a driver for Baitullah, the organisation has struggled to keep its commanders united.

Hakimullah is largely perceived to be a trigger happy and juvenile commander and does not enjoy same status in the eyes of other senior TTP members such as Qari Hussain, Noor Saeed, Maulvi Azmatullah Mehsud, and Rais Khan Mehsud alias Azam Tariq. There is a strong indication that he is continuing to lose control over his local commanders and the affiliate groups. For example, the TTP faction led by Tariq Afridi in Darra Adamkhel and another faction led by Omar Khalid alias Abdul Wali in Mohmand, are operating completely independent of Hakimullah’s command.

Terrorist organisations to be effective are known to provide maximum autonomy to their local chapters. However, for the TTP it is not just “lack of knowledge” of the activities undertaken by its chapters, but appears to be a serious problem of “lack of control.” As a result, while suicide attacks are being disowned by the TTP, its local chapters are owning them up, much to the embarrassment of the parent outfit.

On 11 June, twin bomb blasts ripped through Peshawar’s Khyber supermarket killing over 42 persons. A small blast was triggered by a timed device planted in the bathroom of a hotel. As people gathered close to the site of the explosion, a suicide bomber riding a motorbike blew him self up nearby. TTP chief spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan denied the organisation’s involvement asserting that his organisation is against the targeting of civilians. But subsequently spokesman of TTP’s Darra Adamkhel chapter claimed that they had orchestrated the attack.

A huge element of distrust has continued within the TTP ranks since Baitullah’s death. It is largely believed that intervention by Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Afghan mujahideen fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani, had prevented an armed confrontation between the various factions of would-be Taliban chiefs after Baitullah’s death. Sirajuddin had told the various TTP leaders that they must save their bullets for their enemies.

Sirajuddin’s intervention prevented an armed rivalry between the TTP factions, but has not really led to a warming up of ties between leader Hakimullah Mehsud and his second-in-command Weliur Rahman Mehsud. The latter is in charge of the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan and commands the loyalty of about 7000 to 10,000 fighters. Sources indicate that Hakimullah and Weliur have barely met in months. So much is the suspicion that meetings, if any between these two, have been arranged in the presence of third party commanders and on the specific condition that none present at the meeting would carry weapons.

The state of affairs presents an excellent opportunity for Pakistan to exploit. However, the intended stabilisation of Pakistan through a process that weakens the TTP, but enforces the Afghan Taliban, will have larger repercussions on Afghanistan’s peace and stability.

http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/05/156233.html
Tweet