Weakening the Al Qaeda Structure: Brick by Brick

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Al Arabiya, 10 July 2011

http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/10/157056.html

The anti-Al Qaeda operations of the United States have gained in strength and have been able to neutralize top leaders directly or indirectly affiliated with the terrorist movement. Since the 2 May killing of Osama Bin Laden, the US drone strikes have been able to kill at least three senior terrorist leaders affiliated with the Al Qaeda.

Although the “Base” may still not crumble under the impact of the killings, such successful strikes would most certainly weaken it.

Latest to hit the headlines is the unconfirmed killing of Ibrahim al Afghani, a senior terrorist leader belonging to the al-Shabaab. Somalia based al-Shabaab, which controls north and central parts of Somalia and a large portion of its capital Mogadishu remains closely affiliated with Al Qaeda. Following the death of Osama, al-Shabaab had welcomed the appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri as the next chief of the organization and promised cooperation.

Ibrahim al Afghani, who had fought in Afghanistan for a number of years and received his nom de guerre from his experience there, was reportedly killed in a 25 June drone strike in southern Somalia. The same attack critically injured another senior Al Qaeda commander Bilal El Berjawi, who is believed to have sought treatment in a hospital in neighboring Kenya. According to available reports, Afghani had been appointed as the Emir of al-Shabaab, after it merged with the rival Hizb-ul Islam in December 2010.

Afghani’s killing would be the third in a series of losses for the al-Shabaab. Senior commander Fazul Abullah Mohammed who also served as the leader of Al Qaeda for East Africa had been killed in a check point shootout on the outskirts of Mogadishu by the Somali forces on 8 June.

Previously, on 19 March, Sheik Daud Ali Hasan, al-Shabaab’s “senior official” was killed by unidentified gunmen in the southern port of Kismayu. Hasan was the outfit’s military operations head in the town of Dhobley on the Kenyan border.

The recent report of the killing of Ibrahim al Afghani follows the confirmation by the US intelligence of the killing of senior Pakistani Al Qaeda military commander Ilyas Kashmiri, again in a drone strike in Pakistan’s South Waziristan on 3 June. Kashmiri led the Pakistan based Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI).

Washington had offered a $5 million reward for information leading to Kashmiri’s location. Described by American officials as Al Qaeda’s military operations chief in Pakistan, the 47-year-old Kashmiri had carried out a string of bloody attacks in India as well as aiding terrorist plots in the West. He also had been named a defendant in an American court over a planned attack on a Danish newspaper that carried cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in 2005.

Although the HuJI promptly put up a press release and fake photo of Kashmiri to confirm the killing and also religiously vowed to carry on its anti-America efforts, the failure to retrieve Kashmiri’s dead body from the area or authoritatively confirm his death from the local sources had prolonged the wait for an official corroboration. The US did not even have a DNA sample of Kashmiri. The US officials were cautious this time not to repeat their earlier mistake. In September 2009, Kashmiri had surfaced unscathed after being declared dead.

Again, on 5 July, unconfirmed reports have indicated the death of Saifullah, a 50-year-old Australian, described to be a key aide to Osama bin Laden. Saifullah along with four other militants was killed in a drone attack in Pakistan’s North Waziristan agency.

Of these killings, Kashmiri’s death would have a much more profound impact on HuJI’s operational activities that that of Afghani on al-Shabaab. Kashmiri remained critical to the growth of HuJI and the development of its linkage with the Al Qaeda. The second rung leadership of HuJI would require time to reorganize and begin operating. On the contrary, al-Shabaab is believed to have been weakened by the killings, but still retains sufficient strength to be able to continue its domination over its held areas.

Inarguably, Al Qaeda derives much of its power and wide influence from the successes of its regional affiliates. The weakening of the latter would naturally amount to the gradual decay of the parent organization. The key is keep up the pressure on the affiliates and concentrate on the Al Qaeda safe havens like the North Waziristan agency of Pakistan, which for years has remained outside the focus of the counter-terrorism efforts.