Time to Walk the New Yangon Trail

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Geopolitics, April 2013, Page-64-67.

It is only uncommon that the appointment of an ambassador to a 'non-plum' country generates so much of brokering within New Delhi's power centres. But in the past months, the selection process with regard to Myanmar did, providing thereby many interpretations jostling to capture the full picture. This was seen, as several newspaper reporters projected, as a contest between the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) establishment and the Congress Party high command, each with their preferred candidate for the job. This was also described, as some of the analysts mentioned, a decisive, yet unprecedented role played by the assertive President of India in favour of a particular candidate. While both these accounts were fascinating and captured truth to some extent, it is also important to see the process in terms of a divide among the Indian strategic community as far as New Delhi's policy towards its Southeast Asian neighbour is concerned, i.e. the choice between idealistic and pragmatic approach.

Choice between Candidates

In December 2012 and much of January 2013, media reports speculated the likelihood of two candidates- India's former envoy to several countries including South Africa and former governor to West Bengal, Gopal Krishna Gandhi and India's current ambassador to Afghanistan, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, as the new envoy to Myanmar. Either of them were tipped to replace the current ambassador Dr. Villur Sundararajan Seshadri, in office since July 2010.

The 67-year old Gandhi, a former Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer of Tamil Nadu cadre and grandson of both Chakravarti Rajagopalachari and the father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi reportedly enjoyed support of the Congress Party's high command. The media speculated that the choice peeved the IFS establishment, which vociferously argued that the post must go to a career diplomat with previous experience of serving in a challenging country. The 56-year old Mukhopadhaya, in Kabul since May 2010 and due for a transfer, fit the bill, almost perfectly. According to the media reports, Gandhi's supporters, on the other hand,  vouched for his experience as ambassador to post-apartheid South Africa and Lesotho in 1996. However, the intervention of the President, who according to an analyst, still "continues to assert himself as a notable player in Delhi’s political parlour" ended the debate in favour of Mr. Mukhopadhaya. Barring any last minute trade-offs, the current ambassador to Afghanistan will replace Dr. Seshadri in Yangon in the coming months.

Choice between Strategies

Idealism marked Indian foreign policy towards Myanmar till the 1990s. While maintaining minimal contacts with the military junta that had captured power in Myanmar through a 1962 coup, India chose extend its moral support to the pro-democracy movement  after the military's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power in Myanmar in 1988 and overruled an electoral verdict in favour of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 national elections.

Not only that the Indian Embassy in Yangon (then known as Rangoon) became active in helping pro-democracy activists, India provided shelter to a large number of pro-democracy activists on its soil. The All India Radio (AIR) carried anti-military broadcasts in Burmese language, before the broadcasts were discontinued acceding to the Myanmar government's requests. In 1992, India partnered with the US and other Western countries to sponsor a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the military junta for its violations of human rights. Former Defence Minister George Fernandes' official residence housed Myanmar democracy activists, where a large picture of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was placed. During Prime Minister Chandrasekhar's regime India provided political asylum to two Myanmarese students, who had hijacked a Thai aircraft from Bangkok to Calcutta on 10 November 1990, to draw the international attention to the situation back home.

However, a dramatic and yet decisive shift - from such idealism to pragmatism -started occurring in the late 1990s. Amid disappointments expressed by many within its strategic community buttressed by accusations of abandonment by the pro-democracy activists in Myanmar, New Delhi started engaging the military junta. One of the analysts was to rue the fact that India has abandoned the Gandhian principles. "Under Suu Kyi, the Myanmar people have been emulating the non-violent methods of Gandhiji. We will be betraying the memories of Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other freedom-fighters if we fail to support a Gandhi-inspired movement in Myanmar", he wrote in a column.  

New Delhi started viewing the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar as a lost cause vis-a-vis the overwhelming supremacy of the military. Not surprisingly, the Indian stand was made fairly clear in 2006 by Pranab Mukherjee, then External Affairs Minister of the country. He said that India cannot “export democracy” to neighbouring countries and that India had to deal with governments “as they exist”. There was an overwhelming feeling in the policy circles in New Delhi that India's strategic concerns in Myanmar would be difficult to fulfil unless the government to government contacts are firmed up. These concerns included India's search for energy resources, acting on the remaining strength of the insurgents operating in the northeast, pursuing New Delhi's look-east policy, and dealing with the growing presence of China.

The shift in policy, from idealism to pragmatism, resulted in India making significant headways in Myanmar. It can be safely assumed that among all of New Delhi’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, the one that appears to have moved in the right direction without a hitch is that with Myanmar.

A new Myanmar and India's Growing Imprint

Myanmar has changed enormously in the past two years. A military-dominated regime which tolerated no resistance has presided over a free and fair by-election, allowed the opposition to win maximum number of seats, released jailed opposition activists, eased restrictions on the press, allowed journalists banned from entering into the country for decades to travel almost freely and is also seeking foreign investment. Such changes have opened up opportunities for countries like India.

If high-profile official visits are indications of commitment to take the relationship forward, there have been plenty between the two countries. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Myanmar in May 2012, the first Indian premier to do so after 25 years since Rajiv Gandhi's trip in December 1987. During Singh’s visit, 12 agreements were signed, including one that extended $500 million Line of Credit to Myanmar. President of Myanmar Thein Sein paid a State visit to India in October 2011. In July 2010, Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the now defunct State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), paid a visit to India. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi visited India in November 2012 and President Thein Sein could be revisiting India in March 2013.

Apart from these, ministers and secretaries from both sides have exchanged periodic visits in recent years. India’s Defense Minister A.K. Antony visited Myanmar on 21-22 January 2013 and discussed bilateral defence cooperation and capacity-building measures for Myanmar's armed forces with his counterpart in Naypyidaw. The visit came shortly after foreign minister Salman Khurshid and Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne, in his capacity as the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, visited the country in November-December 2012.

Both countries have moved ahead to establish several institutional mechanisms for engagement on trade, security as well as foreign policy consultations. Significantly, earlier meetings that involved high-ranking officials and were limited to the national capitals have started dripping down to the bordering states. On 9 November 2012, for the first time, a high-level meeting of the India-Myanmar Border Trade Committee held at Moreh in Manipur. As a result of this meeting, a representative office of United Bank of India (UBI) was opened in Yangon on 5 December. Though the representative office does not handle any financial transaction, officials will maintain liaison with the Government, banks and traders to resolve issues relating to settlement of trade-related transaction between both the countries.

In the last week of 2012, India and Myanmar reached an agreement to open the fourth Border Liaison Office (BLO) in the Nagaland sector. Three BLOs are already in operation in the Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram sectors. BLOs have served as mechanisms to promote cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of both countries. The BLO forum has been a product of a high-level meeting between the two countries in May 2012. Officers posted at the BLOs discuss and sort out issues relating to local security and crime, to strengthen bilateral cooperation on border issues.

On 29 October 2012, entrepreneurs from India and Myanmar met at Yangon to discuss ways to promote bilateral trade in agriculture, timber, pharmaceuticals, tourism, textile, automobile and livestock. The India-Myanmar joint trade commission has set the target of doubling the existing trade of $1.5 billion by 2015.

Future Important

New Delhi has done well to stay glued to its policy of engagement with the ruling regime in Myanmar since the 1990s, reversing its decade-long policy of supporting democracy movement in the country. The gradual pace of transformation—from a purely military to a lopsided civilian-military combination in the Parliament—suits New Delhi’s policies. It marks a continuation of New Delhi’s engagement with the regime in Naypyidaw. Even if Myanmar rewrites its 2008 constitution, paving way for a purely civilian government in the country in 2015, the regime would still consist of people who would have done significant business with India.

Additionally, absence of spoilers is one of the important reasons behind New Delhi’s decisiveness. All the north-eastern states have not only been supportive of the Look East Policy, but have contributed to its content and pushed vigorously for its implementation. They have also pressurised New Delhi to take up the insurgency issue seriously with Myanmar, asking Naypyidaw to carry out operations against the north-eastern rebels. India’s capacity-building assistance to the Myanmar military in the past years as well as its aid in the form of road building equipment have allowed the latter to increase the frequency of its operations against the Indian rebels.

Mr. Mukhopadhaya makes almost a perfect choice for the envoy's position. His experience in Afghanistan, where India has done exceedingly well against huge odds to carve out a favourable image and craft an alternative development model for the war-ravaged country, holds him in good stead. India would need his skill to implement similar models in Myanmar, where several bilateral infrastructural projects are far from completion. Unlike Mr. Gandhi whose fondness for Ms. Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement is well known, and hence could have been less palatable to the Myanmar military, Mr. Mukhopadhaya's businessman-like approach would be much more suitable.

China's profile continues to ascend in Myanmar, both in terms of its economic and strategic presence. The combined amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, reached over $20 billion in Myanmar in 2012, accounting for nearly half of the total $41 billion FDI received by the country during the year. China has also started mediating between the Myanmar's ethnic rebels and the government. Competing with China and squeezing it out of Myanmar is none of India's stated official policy. However, in a reform-bound Myanmar, India must take advantage of the enormous prospect of trade and business, especially in gaining access to its rich gas fields, many of which are still unexploited. The scope for Indian embassy in playing a key facilitator in this area is enormous.

For New Delhi, there is still a long road to traverse. Its projected gains in Myanmar would be shaped to a large extent by the changes that occur in Myanmar in the coming months and years. It will also be linked to New Delhi’s capacity to take advantage of the evolving scenario. When almost the entire world is converging on Myanmar, ability to take prompt decisions and pursue them vigorously would be the key. This would require some additional institutional capacity building on part of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Some rethinking on the content of India’s framework engagement in Myanmar that has been deliberately kept apolitical and non-controversial would also be necessary. The appointment of a suitable envoy, thus, would mark the fulfillment of the first of several such requirements. 

http://issuu.com/newsline/docs/geo_apr13/64 

Republished in Eurasia Review