In Meghalaya: The Power of the Small

Bibhu Prasad Routray

18 September 2013

As the country remained busy with other happenings as if those alone decided the destiny of the nation, on 17 September two people were killed and two more injured in Meghalaya's Garo Hills district by the cadres of the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA). The outfit's armed rebels stormed the Garodoba village around 1.30 a.m. and shot dead 32-year-old Sridina A. Sangma and 42-year-old Anirud Hajong. All the rebels escaped.

For the uninitiated, the GNLA is one of five militant groups fighting for a separate Garoland state in western Meghalaya. It was formed in 2009 by a former Meghalaya Police Service (MPS) officer, Champion R. Sangma. Sangma was posted as an Assistant Commandant of the 2nd Meghalaya Police (MLP) Battalion when he disappeared and emerged as the chief of GNLA.

On 30 July 2012, Sangma was arrested by Bangladeshi authorities and handed over to India. He currently is in jail. New leadership has taken over GNLA and has increased the cadre strength to 100 armed fighters. To begin with, GNLA managed with arms provided by ULFA and NDFB, who used the Garo Hills as transit routes between Assam and Bangladesh. Over the years, GNLA managed to establish independent networks for arms acquisition, funded by its rampant extortion activities.

In the last three years, over 40 people, including security personnel, have been killed while more than 10 people were abducted for ransom by the GNLA in three districts of Meghalaya. In recent years, Meghalaya has emerged to be one of the most violent theatres of conflict in the northeastern region. Much of the credit for the state of degeneration is attributable to the GNLA.

At least 112 fatalities have been reported from this state between 2011 and September 2013. This includes 53 civilians. To put in perspective, Assam and Manipur, where militancy is far more well established and wide spread, recorded 77 and 66 civilian fatalities during the same period.

Available data provide an amazing narrative to the "cycle of militancy" in the state. Militancy which peaked in 2002 recording 64 deaths subsided in the following years, after some stringent counter insurgency measures and cooperation from Bangladesh decimated the established outfits, the HNLC and the ANVC. The state, where the Independence and Republic day functions in capital Shillong were deserted affairs due to threats issued by militancy, recovered well. A mere five fatalities (a lone civilian and four militants) were recorded in 2009.

Since then, owing to a 'cool off' in security force action, one is so used to in the Indian context, violence has peaked once again. One of the examples of the state's lethargic counter-insurgency approach is its inability to file charge sheet against Champion R. Sangma in 90 days. In January 2013 a court allowed Sangma to avail bail in two cases, although other cases continued to keep him in prison. 

As counter-terrorism analyses continue to focus on the larger picture and bigger threats, it is probably time direct some energy to study the lethality of the smaller outfits and their destabilising impact on forgotten regions that are as vital as any other part of India.

Republished in Eurasia Review