Bibhu Prasad Routray
Pragati, 6 September 2013
It is apt to start with
an allegory. A school management body decides to rent out the school building
as a function hall during the non-operational hours. It generates a lot of
demand and the building becomes a popular venue for organising events. After a few
months, while deciding to use available funds to renovate the school building, the
management is confronted with a policy predicament whether to upgrade the
school’s facilities to suit the needs of its students or that of the clients
who use it for their events. In a way, this is one of the dilemmas that
confronts the chieftains of the Central Armed Police Force (CAPF), formerly
known as the Central Paramilitary Force (CPMF) institutions, as they attempt to
modernise their forces.
In the first week of
September, Border Security Forces (BSF) personnel teamed up with the Haryana
police to enforce law and order in the Pataudi area, after 16 vehicles were
torched. In June, Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel deployed in
Chhattisgarh’s Rajnandgaon district killed a Maoist commander in an encounter. In
April, 20 odd personnel belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) started
providing security to the chairman of Reliance Industries Limited, Mukesh
Ambani. The drastic temperance in the original terms of reference of the CAPF
institutions is a reality. In fact, the operational incongruity in deploying
the essentially border guarding forces in internal security situations and to
maintain law and order, and specially designated counter-insurgent forces to
provide personal security, is no longer a subject of policy discussion. In the
face of the country’s growing internal security and law and order duties, such
deployments beyond the CAPFs’ conventional area of expertise are expected to
register a continuous growth.
Each of the CAPF
institutions today, thus, is adorned with a split personality: with a primary
duty, conforming to their original terms of references, and with an array of
obligatory secondary duties, which are no less demanding than the former. BSF
battalions are in charge of the Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh border, the ITBP
still guards the Indo-China border, the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) is the force
along the Indo-Nepal border etc. All these forces along with the Central
Industrial Security Force (CISF) are also battling the Maoists, providing VIP security, controlling
riots, responding to relief operations during natural disasters, carrying out
election-related duties, and providing securities to critical infrastructures. On
many occasions, the CAPFs have even excelled in their secondary duties. The
admirable role played by the BSF in counter-Maoist operations in Odisha or the
accomplishments of the ITBP during the June 2013 floods in Uttarkhand and in
protecting the Indian embassy and consulates in Afghanistan
However, whereas the
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the ministry in charge of the CAPFs, appears to
have settled these operational contradictions, mostly citing shortage of forces,
questions regarding how to modernise these forces with such contrasting
assignments are yet to figure in the policy-making circles.
The scheme for
modernisation of the CAPFs, implemented since 2002, aims at increasing the
strike capacities of the forces by providing them with weapons, equipments and
communication systems; upgrading their skills by providing them with training; and
keeping them operationally fit. The achievements under the scheme during the
past decade, however, remain, at best, modest. According to a 2010 evaluation
paper by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD), the stringent
norms imposed by the MHA continue to inhibit timely procurement of arms, ammunition
and other equipments for the forces.
In addition, implementation
of individual schemes of the CAPF institutions, while succeeding in augmenting
the numerical strength of their personnel by adding new battalions, continues
to be driven or affected by the commitment or the lack of it of the leadership.
The fact that the CAPF chiefs, more often than not, do not grow within the
institutions and are often paradropped by the political leadership from other
departments/ states do not help addressing the needs of the forces.
Three following examples
of the disconnect between the leadership and the forces on the ground would
suffice. Till 2011, canteens of the CRPF used economical, yet unhealthy dalda
and vanaspati ghee for preparing food for the personnel on static duty. The age-old
practice was discontinued and healthy cooking oil was introduced after reports
of 140 soldiers of the force dying of cardiac diseases in 2010 hit the media
headlines. Similarly, till 2013, complains regarding the heavy leather boots by
its personnel deployed in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and the Maoist affected
states were ignored by the CRPF leadership. It took a decision by the Home
Secretary to reverse the practice. Even as BSF personnel clamoured for better
weapons and equipments, the authorities diverted a part of the modernisation
funds to build an officer’s mess and a swimming pool in the force’s
headquarters in New Delhi CAG provide several
narratives of a regime of neglect, myopia and lack of drive within the CAPF
institutions. This partially explains why as many as 36618 CRPF, BSF and ITBP
personnel have left their jobs between 2009 and 2012.
Thus, while the plan to
augment the conventional strike capacity of the forces and keeping them
operationally fit has suffered, looking after the specific needs of the CAPFs, operating
outside their known areas of expertise, does not even figure in the
modernisation schemes. In 2009, for example, the BSF unveiled a five year
modernisation project worth Rupees 6,016 crore. The proposed plan involved
recruitment of 30,000 personnel, procurement of new aircrafts, construction of 509
border posts along the Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh border, nine new sectors
and three frontier headquarters. The plan does not even mention the measures to
address the needs of the 11 battalions of the BSF personnel who operate in the
Maoist areas or the countless personnel who manage the law and order duties
across the country. Similarly, the ITBP’s 2012 plan talks about augmenting its
strength by 12 battalions by 2015, but is silent on the needs of its 6000
forces battling the Maoists or its personnel performing a range of additional
duties elsewhere.
While professionalising
the modernisation process by inducting experts and implementing the
recommendations of the projects run by the BPRD is naturally prescribed as
solutions to the problems, such steps do not tinker with the top-heavy model in
the conception and implementation procedures. The solution to woes probably
lies in democratising the process, by establishing permanent and functional
structures within each of the CAPF institutions to receive and internalise the
needs from the ground. Given that whether countering insurgency or implementing
the law and order is a small commander’s effort, not heeding to the calls from
the ground is indefensible.
No comments:
Post a Comment