Bibhu Prasad Routray
New Indian Express, 2 December 2012
On
November 25, at least two press releases reached the media houses in the
Northeast. The first one from the anti-talk Paresh Baruah faction of the ULFA
criticised the divisive policies of New Delhi
of creating autonomous councils in Assam
under the Sixth schedule of the Constitution. The second one from the breakaway
faction of the ANVC in Meghalaya warning the politicians in the state not to
underestimate the outfit. These releases sum up the new conflict eco system in
the Northeast, where insurgent violence has waned, yet peace remains a distant
dream.
For
the past couple of years, New Delhi
has underlined the improvement in Northeast’s security situation—its claims
buttressed by the declining figures in insurgency-related violence since 2010. Corresponding
with the installation of the Awami League government in Dhaka
and its decision to hound up and hand over several top insurgent leaders to India ,
insurgent activities in the region has waned. As many as 6,698 insurgents
surrendered between 2005 and 2011, leaving many of the major outfits
drastically short of cadres. Over a dozen insurgent outfits are on ‘suspension
of operations’ mode with the government. Over ground pro-talk insurgent leaders
decry violence and ask their former colleagues to join their ranks. The Naga
insurgency is reportedly the closest to a solution in its entire history of six
decades.
In
spite of this, it appears the opportunity to establish durable peace in the
region has been wasted. The phase of the decline in insurgent activities, mostly
a gift from Dhaka and certainly not the product of the
decades-long counter-insurgency operations of the army, paramilitary and the
police combine, has passed. New Delhi
continues to wait and watch, while the nature of conflict in the Northeast has
transformed.
Firstly,
while the narratives on insurgency woven around the activities of the bigger
outfits have lost much their relevance, in the absence of a strategy to deal
with the evolving scenario, the vacuum has been filled in by smaller
outfits—breakaway factions of the old outfits as well as new entities. Secondly,
the tactic of insurgency has changed from one that aims to destabilise the
existence of the state to one that benefits from its continuation. As a result,
while killings have diminished, incidents of extortion has picked up. Thirdly, while
the threat to India ’s
territorial integrity has been diluted to a large extent as a result of the
decline in the larger outfits, the smaller and new outfits remain potential
contact as well as collaboration points for the external forces.
Following
are examples of the continuation of chaos in the region even after Dhaka ’s
cooperation. On November 24, the ANVC-B carried out an attack on the Deputy
Chief Minister of Meghalaya. Deborah C Marak was held briefly at gun point by
the militants, pleaded for mercy and probably was let off because she was a
woman. Insurgents in the Northeast are known to spare women from their line of
fire. Similarly, the ULFA, even with its top leader reportedly hiding along the
Myanmar-China border, has continued with its extortion drive in Assam .
Not only the business houses and tea gardens readily part with the protection
money, recently a Congress minister admitted to having paid extortion to the
outfit. The erstwhile Bodo insurgency has remained the source of some of the recent
riots in Assam .
Regular incidents of extortion and kidnapping are still being reported from
Manipur and Nagaland. Several insurgent outfits in Manipur have formed an
umbrella organisation to carry on the fire of revolution burning. The prospects
of peace rekindled after the handover of senior Manipuri insurgent leader
Sanayaima by Dhaka has gone awry. Even in Tripura, where
few years back a potent insurgency was driven to a state of serious weakness, the
remnants refuse to give up.
Where
is New Delhi lacking?
Much
of New Delhi ’s force-centric
counter-insurgency strategy has been based on two premises—the invincibility of
the Indian state and the luxury of time. Very few in New
Delhi ’s policy circles believe that the armed
insurgencies pose a credible threat to India ’s
territorial integrity. Similarly, policy makers are equally convinced that
whereas New Delhi can procrastinate,
the insurgencies must demonstrate results within a time frame, lest they go out
of popular imagination. Not surprisingly, toothless counter-insurgency
operations by the central forces, a chronic dependency syndrome among the state
police establishments and unending, yet purposeless rounds of dialogue with the
insurgent outfits in ceasefire mode are some of the products of the strategy.
Chaos
is starting to fester yet again in the Northeast, while New
Delhi is comfortable with emphasising the narratives
of absence of violence.
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