Bibhu Prasad Routray
New Indian Express, 20 January 2013
"What
goes up must come down.” Despite the drastic decline in the Naxal violence in 2012,
applying this Newtonian logic to India ’s
most serious internal security challenge would be way too premature. While the
prevailing state of affairs does provide some hope, it requires a sustained
effort on part of the governments—New Delhi
and the states—to further improve the security situation. To assume
fatalistically that the Left-wing Extremism (LWE) problem would end on its own
would be a serious mistake.
LWE-related
violence reached its lowest in 2012, ever since the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI -Maoist) was formed by merging the
People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre in 2004. Ability of the
extremists to inflict violence on persons and institutions maintaining direct
and indirect links with the state was somewhat contained. All denominators of
Naxal strength and spread—holding of people’s courts and training camps—were
down compared to 2011. Significantly, both the official statements and those by
the Maoist propaganda units underlined losses to the “party”. Yet in this
moment of perceived triumph, to assume that the core strength of the extremists
has started disintegrating would be inaccurate.
The
LWE movement, under the banner of the CPI -Maoist,
has demonstrated three distinct strengths. One, the outfit has switched
seamlessly between phases of intense action to phases of sporadic action. Second,
subsequent to the loss of some of its senior leadership, it has managed to
successfully enforce a strict regime of do’s and don’ts to prevent further
losses. And third, its support as well as action bases— the People’s Liberation
Guerrilla Army cadres and the over-ground workers/ sympathisers—have
continually expanded, with the pace of such growth determined by prevailing
ground situations. I argue that the gains made by the state in 2012 have not
made any significant impact on any of such abilities.
Let’s
turn our attention on three comparable details of the state successes against
the extremists. First, the government claims to have regained some areas under
Naxal control. Last year, CRPF chief Vijay Kumar, on the eve of his retirement,
claimed that his forces have managed to free about 5,000 sq km of areas
previously under extremist domination. While establishment of government
control over such reclaimed areas is highly subjective, the fact remains that
focused area operations, rather than the nationwide, multi-theatre Operation of
the ‘Green Hunt’ variety, have produced successes. The overall narrative of
official conquest vis-a-vis the extremists is built around such small area
operations in states like Jharkhand.
Further,
neutralisation of senior leaders in the Maoist hierarchy has produced serious
leadership vacuum in the outfit, which according to the outfit itself, has been
“difficult to fill”. Maoist publications have detailed the loss of over 100
cadres and leaders in 2011. And last, ideological as well as opportunistic
splits, mostly in Jharkhand and Odisha, damaged the consolidated profile of the
extremists. Not surprisingly, the CPI -Maoist
has called for preservation of its leaders and cadres and also, adoption of a
new strategy of warfare.
The
strategy, which appears to have come into force in the second half of 2012, is
a mix of old tactics as well as new. It aims at preserving cadres, carrying out
surprise attacks targeting security forces and counter-Naxal vigilante forces, and
maintaining a steady flow of newly recruited cadres into the outfit’s military
wing. Attacks by Naxals have started using the novel method of planting
explosives on dead bodies of security forces. There is also a renewed attempt
to internationalise alleged state brutalities. An international conference was
held in Hamburg (Germany )
in support of the people’s war in India
in November 2012.
Interestingly,
under this strategy the outfit also continues to harp on its own weakness. An
unusually high number of Naxal press releases, posted online in 2012, detailed
the loss of cadres and leaders. The overall objective appeared to be directed
at driving a sense of false victory and inertia among the establishment, thereby
slowing down state initiatives.
While
the military initiatives against the extremists may not have slackened, a
serious casualty of this sense of victory now appears to be the state approach
to developing the liberated areas. A key pillar of the twin official counter-Naxal
strategy—initiating development activities in areas cleared of Naxal
control—receives much less attention in official statements these days.
The
official anti-Naxal efforts have indeed reached a delicate stage. Unless
handled with commitment, the gains made thus far can easily be frittered away.
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