Bibhu Prasad Routray
IPCS Article No. 3795, 17 January 2013
Ever
since contact between the Communist Party of India -Maoist
(CPI -Maoist) and an insurgent group
operating in India 's
northeast was first established in 2006, the Naxalites have pursued twin
objectives in the region. Firstly, the Northeast has been used as a transit
route to ferry arms and other ammunition from China .
Secondly, the region has also figured in the geographical expansion strategy of
the extremists. What has been their success in these two objectives? Are they
relatively more successful in their first objective than the second? Why?
For
the CPI -Maoist, 2008 was a landmark year. In
October that year, they issued a joint statement with the Manipur-based People's
Liberation Army (PLA ). Both reiterated their
commitment to "consolidate the mutual understanding and friendship" and
to "stand hand in hand to overthrow the common enemy". Intelligence
agencies, however, maintain that the links between the two had been firmed up
in 2006. Since then, and till 2011, the PLA
assisted the Maoists in procuring Chinese arms and communication equipment via Myanmar .
The PLA also provided training to the
Maoists. A PLA leader, who had led a team of
instructors to train Maoists in Jharkhand, was arrested in April 2012.
While
the PLA fulfilled the crucial logistic requirements
of the Maoists, it was Assam ,
bordering West Bengal , which figured prominently in the
expansion plan of the CPI -Maoist. Interestingly,
the operational weakness of the most prominent insurgent group in the state - the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), served the Maoists’ interests well. According
to intelligence sources, the Maoists first attempted to court fringe Adivasi
groups in Assam .
However, they had to settle for the ULFA since most of the Adivasi groups were,
and still are, in the process of negotiations with the state. Assam 's
Police database on 150 Maoist cadres in the state includes many former ULFA
cadres.
The
willingness of the ULFA to play facilitator to Maoist strategies for the
Northeast had become apparent in 2010. That year, ULFA Chief Paresh Baruah
congratulated the Maoists for carrying out successful strikes on the security
forces in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada. Again, in 2011, the ULFA extended its
sympathy after senior Maoist leader Kishenji was killed in West
Bengal . In May 2012, Baruah criticising the killing of four Maoist
cadres in Assam ,
reiterated "We (the Maoists and the ULFA) may have different ideologies
but we share a common quest. Our enemy is common and the Maoists have our
complete moral support."
Interestingly,
however, official assessments carried out by New Delhi
and Assam till
mid-2012, differed significantly on the issue of ULFA and Maoist linkages. In
June 2012, the then Home Minister P Chidambaram, responding to increasing talks
about a nexus between the Maoists and the ULFA, reiterated that the central
agencies have no proof of such a linkage.
The Assam
government, on the other hand, underlined the existence of such a nexus. In May
2012, the Assam Police declared to have created a database of 150 active Maoist
cadres in Assam .
A month later, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi asserted, "Be it ULFA, be it
NSCN-IM or be it (Manipur’s) PLA , every one
has close links with the Maoists. We have no doubt about that.” Contradicting
the then Union Home Minister's statement, the Chief Minister went on to assert,
"He (Chidambaram) may have his own sources, but I have my own."
Subsequently,
New Delhi fell in line and started
supporting the Assam
government's view point on the Maoists. In December 2012, Union Rural Development
Minister Jairam Ramesh went to the extent of suggesting that the upper Assam
districts- Dibrugarh and Tinsukia should be included in the list of Left Wing
Extremism-affected districts.
While
the debate over the attempts of the Maoists to find a foothold in Assam
and the rest of the Northeast is more or less settled, the extent of their
actual presence continues to be a matter of speculation. It is apparent that
the Assam
government is inclined to portray an alarmist description woven around Maoist
fundraising, recruitment and plans for violence.
However,
the fact remains that the expansionist quest of the CPI -Maoist
in Assam is
also a narrative of repeated setbacks and failures. In May 2012, for example, the
four Maoists killed in Tinsukia district included the outfit's area commander
Siddhartha Bargohain. During a year prior to that incident, over 60 Maoist cadres and over-ground
workers had been arrested from several upper Assam
districts. Recent media reports on 16
January 2013 indicated the arrest of Maoist central committee
member Alok Bakshi in Visakhapatnam .
Bakshi was in charge of the expansion plan of the Maoists in Assam .
Therefore it can be reasonably concluded that, so far, the attempts by the
Maoists to gain a foothold in the Northeast have been successfully dealt with.
This
reality on the ground, as well as the sufficient awareness generated so far on
the Maoist activities provides added advantage to the security establishment in
Assam and other
Northeast states to checkmate future LWE endeavours in the region. The
Northeast has a substantial central force presence. The police in these states
too, have sufficient counter-insurgency experience. The dip in insurgency-related
violence in the region in recent years, further allows the police to
concentrate its efforts on Maoist activities in the future.
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