Bibhu Prasad Routray
The
recent spar between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MHA) provides yet another occasion to raise some questions on what appears to
be a recurring trend in the country’s military approach to Naxal conflict. In
spite of the prolonged engagement in Naxal theatres, does unity of purpose
continue to be a casualty among the security forces? Are basic camaraderie and
coordination among the forces, standard rules of the game, conspicuous by their
absence? Are the forces fighting the Naxals an unwilling bunch of men in
uniform who have been constrained to operate much against their will? Answers
are crucial, for these would have a bearing on the future of the conflict.
On
January 18, an IAF Mi-17 helicopter, on a rescue mission to evacuate an injured
CRPF personnel and the body of another, was forced to make an emergency landing
in the densely forested Sukma district of Chhattisgarh after it came under fire
from the Naxals. The police wireless operator on board the helicopter was hit
by a bullet. What happened afterwards defied logic. The two IAF pilots then
abandoned the helicopter and the injured wireless operator and scurried to the
safety of a nearby police camp. The injured wireless operator, by the sheer
dint of luck, survived till his evacuation four hours later. He is recovering
from his injuries, although his “police career” has been described by the
attending doctors as “over”.
Both
the Chhattisgarh Police and the MHA blamed the pilots for abandoning the injured
wireless operator. The IAF chief, however, came out in their defence, seeking
not only to downplay the nature of injuries to the police personnel but also
expressing satisfaction with the turn of events “which could have easily turned
into a hostage situation” had the pilots not decided to run for security cover.
The IAF chief’s comments have come for severe criticism. The MHA has called for
a probe into the pilots’ conduct.
The
army and the air force’s minuscule presence in the Naxal theatre is unenthusiastic,
to say the least. While an army brigadier advises the MHA’s Naxal Management
Division, the air force flies the helicopters for logistical requirements for
the police and Central forces. The Ministry of Defence’s steady opposition has
played a spoiler in the MHA’s repeated attempts to expand army’s role in the
Naxal conflict. In the first week of February, the Committee of Secretaries (CoS)
shot down an MHA plan to revive the proposal of deploying Rashtriya Rifles for
static duties in the Naxal-infested areas.
It
would appear that the clock has turned full circle for the victims, i.e. the
Chhattisgarh Police, in a matter of less than three years. Back in 2010, a
neatly organised Naxal ambush wiped out an entire company of the Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in the Dantewada district. It was the biggest-ever
attack on the Central forces which undermined the force morale and led, within
months, to the near abandonment of Operation Green Hunt. However, responding to
a media query regarding how the CRPF could have been targeted so lethally by
the Naxals, then Chhattisgarh police chief quipped, “We can’t teach the CRPF to
walk.” The CRPF authorities reacted with a volley of accusations against the
police before the matter was hushed up by the MHA.
Unlike
the army, the Central armed police force personnel have designated roles in the
Naxal conflict.
While the mandate of supporting the state police forces has been put to good
use in some of the states, in many others, the ‘jointness’ suffers from a range
of deficiencies—coordination among the forces being the most serious. State
police forces, reluctant to lead, depend on the capacities of the
Central
forces to deal with the Naxals. Central forces, on the other hand, want to
confine themselves to only a supporting role. Even within the police forces, the
inclination of the IPS officers is to avoid
becoming commanders of fighting battalions. Not long ago, a senior army
official had advised the MHA to turn file-pushing desk officers into battalion
leaders. In sum, the anti-Naxal military coalition today appears to consist of
highly committed as well as equally apathetic forces.
The
Naxal situation in the country has undergone some improvements in the past year,
raising hopes of its complete resolution. However, for such efforts to succeed
on the military front, there must be a ‘coalition of the willing’—responsible
and prepared to own up the war efforts.
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