New Delhi's Maldivian Dilemma

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Geopolitics, March 2013, pp. 72-74.

Past sins return to haunt again and again. The Government of India would find the old adage extremely relevant, especially in the context of Maldives. Its diplomatic mishandling of the political developments in the island nation since February 2012, continues to present it with ever increasing complex choices. Escapist policies pursued so far has not helped. Time is ripe enough for some deep thinking and a course of action that solves the crisis in Male and restores India's strategic interests in that country.

Strategic community in New Delhi are united in their view that India committed a series of monstrous diplomatic blunders in Maldives. Firstly, it extended a speedy recognition to the Mohamed Waheed government in Male in February last year, which had replaced a pro-India regime headed by President Mohamed Nasheed. Secondly, it chose not to stand by the GMR company, when its contract to build the airport in Male was annulled by the Waheed government. And thirdly, in spite of the fact that India's strategic interests were eroding fast, New Delhi opted for a public spat rather then quiet and forceful diplomacy with the government in Male. 

In addition to these rather well-publicised missteps, New Delhi continued to ignore the growth of Islamist radicalism in Maldives, which not only pushed an anti-India agenda, but also indulged in cultural vandalism targeting signs of multiculturalism. Till very late, India ignored a series of measures initiated by the Maldives government against Indian citizens including imprisonment, deportation and visa cancellation.

From lack-lustre to fist-fighting

New Delhi assumed that the change in Presidency in February 2012 was a harmless transfer of power. President Nasheed, who had won the 2008 elections with more than 54 percent of the votes and whose pro-India stance was never in question labelled the transfer of power a coup. But New Delhi chose to look the other way. Vice President Mohamed Waheed, who became President overnight, was extended a swift recognition by the Prime Minister’s Office. Much of this had to do with the ‘pro-India’ certificate he received from then Indian high commission in Male. A note from the ambassador mentioned that Waheed’s pro-India stand “is not in question” since he “has not missed a single function in the India House”. Ironically, the same ambassador, within months, was termed a “traitor” and “an enemy of Maldives” by the Presidential spokesman.

The GMR issue caught Delhi by surprise. The 27 November decision by the Waheed government to annul the agreement with the Indian company came as a bolt from the blue for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), headed by a new minister, Salman Khurshid. New Delhi had hoped that telephonic conversations between Khurshid and his counterpart in Male would be sufficient to deter Maldives from annulling the agreement.

On 27 November, MEA statements, in no uncertain terms, underlined that the decision by the Maldives cabinet would adversely impact the bilateral relations. The Ministry had vowed to “take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of its interests and its nationals”. In less than two weeks, MEA’s valour had taken a beating. On 10 December, the Ministry was merely hoping that the takeover of the airport by the government in Male would not affect the bilateral ties. Salman Khurshid meekly wished that the incident “will not be used or allowed to be used by some fringe political groups that would lead to deterioration of  relations between two”.

In retrospect, 8 December ruling by the Singapore courts in favour of the Maldives government came as providence for the MEA. It provided a much-needed soft landing for the Ministry’s lack of ability. After the ruling, Khurshid was quick to underline the “legal” basis of the problem and expressed helplessness of the government to do anything in the face of such a ruling. Interestingly, the minister appeared to overlook the determination of the Maldives government to go ahead with the airport takeover irrespective of the court ruling.

If the initial assessments on Waheed's pro-India stand and the GMR being stand alone legal issue were highly misplaced, Delhi did not fare any better in the subsequent months. It froze major aid promised to Maldives, toughened visa regulations cutting down the number of daily visas it issues to the Maldivians seeking medical treatment in India, refused the Maldives Foreign Minister to set up a meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister, and reportedly did away with the special privileges accorded to the Maldivian vessels visiting Indian ports.

In the second week of January, the Indian High Commission went a step further to issue an 11-point list of grievances to the Maldives media. The HC accused the Maldives government of withholding the passports and restricting the travel of Indian nationals, refusing to renew visas in a timely fashion, exploiting Indian workers, and failing to investigate threat calls to Indian diplomats. While New Delhi’s new policy is all about fighting it out with the Maldives, it appears unaware that its actions have hurt even the pro-India constituents within the country.

It was probably anticipated in Delhi that the Waheed government would change it course in face of such wave of tough measures. Again, New Delhi's hopes were belied. The government in Male chose to fight back, both in words and deed. It matched the New Delhi's press releases by its own allegations of India's interference in its internal affairs. It has also reinstated persons, who had earlier issued categorical anti-India public statements, in important positions.

It also tried playing the China card. In December 2012, Minister of Defence and National Security Mohamed Nazim went to China where he assured the Chinese Minister of National Defence that Maldives was “willing to cement relations between the two countries and their militaries”. Maldives requested a soft loan of $54 million for an IT infrastructure project from China. The Chinese telecom equipment-maker Huawei Technologies has already signed an agreement with Maldives’ National Centre of Information Technologies to develop IT infrastructure under the ‘Smart Maldives Project’. MEA reportedly is yet to decide on its course of action after the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) filed a report in this connection.

  

In a nutshell, the inability of New Delhi to secure its interests had much larger impact than usually anticipated.  Firstly, it underlined the fact that being pro-India is not a necessary qualification for the governments in Male. And secondly, India's position became even more vulnerable, with the deepening polarisation in Maldives' political scene.

Intellectual Vacuum

Given India’s historical as well as contemporary linkages, its economic influence and the sheer footprints Indians and Indian companies enjoy in Maldives, New Delhi’s diplomatic leverage over Male is expected to be the most authoritative. With a total strength of 28,000, Indians are the second largest expatriate community in the Maldives. More than one-fourth of Maldives’ 400 doctors are Indians. More than one-fourth of its teachers are Indian. MEA’s inability to strategise such strength appeared bewildering, to say the least.

However, New Delhi's harakiri in Maldives is indeed a narrative on one of its most glaring problems in foreign policy-making — the inability of the MEA to evaluate unfolding events and strategise accordingly. Much has been written about MEA’s institutional deficiencies. Maldives, in the MEA, is handled by the Joint Secretary of the BSM (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar) division. Obviously, with these three important countries demanding his attention, little quality time is left for Maldives. The BSM division has an advisor for Maldives. But even appointing this retired bureaucrat neither helps addressing the problem of staff shortage, nor does it add to the Ministry's level of competence. It is not surprising that the last update of the ‘country brief’ on Maldives on MEA’s website (at the time of the writing of the piece) was in January 2012.

Even in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) that supports the National Security Adviser (NSA), Maldives remains a neglected area of focus. An officer looking at 15 other countries is usually assigned to prepare an incident-inspired brief. None of India’s universities teaching international relations has an expert on Maldives. Not a single think tank, both government and private, in India, has produced a single policy paper on Maldives in the past years.

Products of this abysmal lack of knowledge, both within and outside the government in New Delhi, on a country that is an integral part of the South Asian community are incongruous conclusions on several aspects potentially impacting the security of India. For example, there is little knowledge about the penetration of the Chinese into the official circles as well as the political parties in Maldives. Little effort goes into documenting, let alone analysing, the continuous anti-India tirade carried out by the politically influential fringe groupings in Maldives. Similarly, growing role of Islamist radicals and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) cadres within Maldives’ mostly moderate Muslim population also belongs to the realm of the unknown.

Future Unknown

Between 15 and 19 February, following Mr. Nasheed's 13 February entry into the Indian High Commission premises, to evade arrest warrant issued by a court, four successful attempts at defacing the website of the Indian High Commission in Male were made. A message, "Give us Nasheed or we Kick the Embassy" was posted by the hacker, indicating the probable role played by the anti-Nasheed camp in the cyber attack. Not only the intense political polarisation in the country, but also the ever-growing attack on India's role by the pro-Waheed camp would demand New Delhi's constant attention in the coming days. New Delhi has called for an all inclusive Presidential election in September 2013 providing all candidates a fair chance. However, such a hope would be severely tested in view of the Maldives judiciary taking tough stand on Mr. Nasheed. The role of former President Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom, who oscillates seamlessly between measured silence and back-door politicking, would also remain crucial for the country's politics. Active engagement and not argumentative detachment would have to be India’s policy in Maldives.

Maldives presents a complex challenge for India's diplomacy. With the hopes of a negotiated settlement to the crisis virtually ruled out, the months preceding the September polls would invariably add more complexities. Unless handled deftly, New Delhi would be left to rue its missteps for foreseeable future.

Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray, a Singapore based analyst, was Deputy Director, National Security Council Secretariat, New Delhi. He can be contacted at bibhuroutray@gmail.com and followed on Twitter @BibhuRoutray

Republished in Eurasia Review