27 January 2014
Surrender of
a top leader is not an event an extremist outfit looks forward to in the
beginning of a new year. On 13 January, GVK Prasad alias Gudsa Usendi, spokesperson
of Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee of the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI -Maoist), surrendered to
the Andhra Pradesh police. Usendi was in charge of issuing press statements on
behalf of the outfit. He was also responsible for some of the its military
successes in Chhattisgarh, having directed and coordinated attacks in which
security force personnel were killed. In his surrender statement, Usendi
complained of ill health and disillusionment with the outfit's excessive
reliance on violence. Usendi's surrender was followed by few other surrenders
of low and middle ranking cadres in Chhattisgarh.
A couple of
days later, the CPI -Maoist issued an audio
statement trivializing the impact of Usendi's surrender. In the recorded
statement issued to the press, Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee secretary
Ramanna, called Usendi a 'traitor' and a 'morally flawed' individual. Ramanna
criticised Usendi's ways with the women cadres and accused him of abandoning
his wife and surrendering with another woman cadre, Santoshi Markam. The
statement also noted that such surrenders, which is 'not a new phenomenon for
the revolutionary movement' would have no impact on the revolution that the
Maoists are waging.
The
statement, at one level, was a natural reaction of the outfit, which has suffered
from a series of splits and surrenders, and has also lost a number of senior
leaders to arrests and killings in the past years. While deaths and arrests are
unavoidable parts of its military campaign, the outfit was most perturbed by
the possible impact of the public denouncement of its ideology by its erstwhile
lieutenants. By criticising the surrendering cadres and idolising the ones who
got killed in encounters with the security forces, the Maoists want to keep
their flock together.
Recent history
of left-wing extremism in India West Bengal . Sabyasachi
Panda's in August 2012 rebellion in Odisha was a serious setback for the
outfit's plan of expansion in that state. The September 2009 arrest of Kobad Ghandy and the July 2010 killing of
Cherikuri Rajkumar alias Azad constituted blows to the outfit's policy making apparatus
as well as to its expansion strategy in southern India
At the other
level, the satisfaction expressed in the official circles, post Usendi's
surrender that the CPI -Moist would
eventually crumble because of its excessive reliance on violence and
disenchantment of its cadres from the party's ideology, may be misplaced. That
Usendi's surrender and fair treatment accorded to him by the state would lead
to a stream of surrenders of top cadres is far fetched. That Maoist violence
would die a natural death without any substantial effort from the state is an unreal
expectation.
Ground
reality in the Maoist conflict theatres is a tale of incessant Maoist violence.
While the level of violence orchestrated in 2010, so far the worst year of
Maoist violence, resulting in the deaths of 1005 civilians and security forces
would possibly remain unmatched, 2013 continued to witness unacceptable level
of violence accounting for 394 lives. Although this is a marginal decline over
the previous year, in which 415 fatalities were recorded, the extremists
continue to be influential in their stronghold areas. In spite of the killing
of 99, surrender of 283 and arrest of 1397 Maoist cadres in 2013, the outfit's
level of violence has not shown signs of abatement. States like Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha remain
affected by significant amount of extremist mobilisation as well as violence.
The holding
of peaceful assembly elections in Chhattisgarh in November has been projected
as an achievement for the state. This was achieved mostly due to the deployment
of about 150 companies of central security forces. There was little to suggest
that the state is in the process of developing its wherewithal to replicate the
Andhra Pradesh success on its soil. Of the 218 encounters between the security
forces and the extremists, 92 took place in this state. Bihar 's unique
approach towards the problem has merely translated into its diminishing ability
to neutralise the Maoists, where as the extremists continue to kill, abduct and
snatch weapons. Not a single Maoist was killed in this state in 2013, although
42 civilians and 27 security forces lost their lives in extremist attacks. While
Maoist inroads into the northeast remains mostly an exaggerated claim by the Assam CPI -Maoist appears to have
made concerted efforts for expansion into the southern states.
In 2013, security
forces scored small victories against the Maoists. Small area operations led to
recovery of areas under the Maoist stronghold in Jharkhand and Odisha. But the
year also witnessed setbacks in the form of the Darbha attack in Chhattisgarh's
Sukma district in May in which 27 people including some senior politicians were
killed. Interrogation of Gudsa Usendi revealed details of the planning that
went into carrying out the attack. In addition, in Jharkhand, the CPI -Maoist
carried out a pre-planned attack killing the Superintendent of Police of Pakur
district in July. Moreover, the security forces in Chhattisgarh were also
involved in at least two encounters in which civilians rather than extremists
were killed, highlighting the persistence of intelligence collection problems.
It is the
continuing ability to inflict damages on the state, which would keep the CPI -Maoist
relevant in the eyes of its sympathisers. On the other hand, continuous
failings of the state to implement a strategy against the extremists will maintain
the CPI -Maoist's position as a
potent adversary in 2014.
Republished in Eurasia Review under the title, 2013 Assessment: Naxalism in India.
Republished in Eurasia Review under the title, 2013 Assessment: Naxalism in India.
No comments:
Post a Comment