Book Review: THE SIEGE: THE ATTACK ON THE TAJ by Adrian Levy & Cathy Scott-Clark

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Book Review India, Volume 38, No.2, February 2014

The title of the book suggests that it is only a narrative on the attack on Taj Hotel, one of the several targets during the three-day long Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. And yet, The Siege tells a full story of the terrorist ‘Operation Bombay’, almost. In a never before narrative on the ‘mother of all terrorist attacks’ on the Indian soil, and a wonderful exhibition of the art of story telling, the book reconstructs the prelude to the attack, the attack per se and the experience thereafter. 

The single most important point that The Siege makes is that the attacks were preventable, both at their points of impact, i.e., the attack sites, but also at the points of their origin. It also underlines that the magnitude of human fatalities could have been far more catastrophic had the original objectives of the terrorists, to ‘convert the attack into a hostage situation’ and ‘burn down the hotel completely’, not been foiled by isolated acts of bravery.

The book is about a huge range of people—about the elite who could afford US$ 5000 a night to stay in the premium suite at the Taj and also about the flower decorators who earned a paltry Rupees 6000 a month. It is about a rude food critic who got asphyxiated in her super luxury room and also about the hotel manager, who survived, but lost his wife and children. It is about the Members of Parliament (MP) who would drink to the brim in the five star hotel and would evade paying up. It is also about a father who re-entered the hotel to rescue his daughter only to embrace death. It is about negligence, corruption, and selfishness. It is also about personal courage and selfless sacrifice. 

The books terms the response to the Mumbai attack a 'triumph of men over machinery'. It was also, as a senior police official mentions, "a failure of imagination on the part of the police and intelligence agencies." The book reiterates that gross intelligence and security lapses enabled the attack to happen in the first place. Intelligence that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) was trying to carry out an audacious sea-borne attack on Mumbai in general and the five-star hotels like the Taj and Trident in particular was available years before the attack. Moles within the LeT as well as key witnesses such as a wife of David Headley had relayed, in no uncertain terms, that 'Operation Bombay' was underway.

However, a United States (US) agency ensured that counter-intelligence on David Headley never made to the higher levels. Back home, attempts of concerned police officials in Mumbai at target hardening was foiled at various levels, with the Coast Guard citing lack of funds and the Taj authorities dismissing the warning because they wanted their guests to be welcomed by their neatly dressed 'chobedars' and not by the armed guards. Armed with only Walkie Talkie sets, the Black Suits security team of the Taj was a mere band of young men, high in spirits, but with little else. With the architectural design of the hotel non-existent, even the most efficient counter-terror force of the country found itself entering a black hole.

New Delhi has continuously loathed, albeit for valid reasons, at the Pakistani non-cooperation in pursuing the perpetrators of the attack, in spite of the multiple dossiers being submitted to Islamabad. However, it is also a fact that unlike the 9/11 attack in the United States and the 7/7 attack in the United Kingdom, the 26/11 attacks remain poorly studied and less documented in India itself. Witnesses and survivors have run pillar to post to register their version of the story before being shooed away. The banker from Kerala, K. Ramamoorthy, who spent four hours as a hostage inside the Taj discovered to his horror that the Mumbai police was least interested in his unique description of the four terrorists who not only punched and kicked him for hours, but also spoke to their handlers at length in his presence.

The Pradhan Committee, a two-man fact finding body, that investigated the attack found its report rejected. The police commissioner of Mumbai who ensured that the response of his force was reduced to minimal till the National Security Guards (NSG) landed in Mumbai was subsequently promoted as the Director General of Police (DGP). The Home Minister, who played some part in the 12-hour delay between the terrorists opening fire at Leopold Cafe, the first target and the NSG responding with theirs at the Taj, lost his job and yet was offered a gubernatorial position. Political career of the Maharashtra Chief Minister, who had to resign after touring the attack sites with his actor son and a movie director, was revitalised in a couple of years. At various levels, it would appear, that India failed its own people in the name of resilience.

Some steps have been taken since the Mumbai attacks. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has been established, the NSG has multiple hubs and the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is off the starting block. However, a counter-terror architecture, envisaged by erstwhile Home Minister P Chidambaram, remains incomplete. With politics kicking in on the issue of formation of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), one wonders whether democracy as a form of government is the least suited to building such an architecture. The lack of police and intelligence reforms and haphazard political will to set things right have been evident in the multiple terror attacks that the country has witnessed since 26/11.

The Siege is suited for a wide range of readers - counter-terrorism analysts, human interest fellows, and even for the movie makers. It busts several myths and makes some astounding revelations. The NSG's first team to be sent to Mumbai was only 120 strong as the plane belonging to the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) could take that much. The Mumbai police commissioner's difference with one of his senior officers led to the latter being confined to the control room, while his presence was badly missed in the hotel.

The book is not without some minor and mostly copyediting bloopers. When hundreds of names get included in a study of this nature, such mix ups are perhaps inevitable. Few names are wrongly spelt and Vinita Kamte is described as wife of Hemant Kamte, mixing up of names of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Hemant Karkare and Additional Commissioner Ashok Kamte, both killed in the attacks. Then Home Minister of the country, Shivraj Patil, who requested to be picked up from his residence to travel along with the NSG chief during the operations, is confused with the Home Secretary.  

It has already received rave reviews across the world, with Indian commentators wondering why a study of this nature could not be accomplished by a native. Whether this is due to the dominance of the Indian strategic writing domain by journalists, grossly inclined to reproduce briefs provided by intelligence agencies or the sense of detachment pervading the arm chair experts reluctant to move beyond the comforts of the workstations and workshops, are serious questions to ponder over. Several opportunities of redemption, however, are still available. Several aspects of the Mumbai attacks still remain unknown even after 'The Siege'. Unlike Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, who travelled across continents to use the 'memories' of the people involved 'to construct a timeline', tonnes of facts still need to be holed out within the sub-continent. 

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-2478/2014/february/2/2611-constructing-a-timeline.html