Bibhu Prasad Routray
Would the
Maoists continue to carry out intermittent attacks targetting the state in the
foreseeable future? Or would they eventually disintegrate and disappear owing
to a leadership crisis because the state has been able to neutralise some of
their top leaders while the remaining are too old for a continuous fight? The
answers would shape the response to what has been the most potent case of
extremism in India
Commentary on
the activities of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI -Maoist) has
been in a state of flux in recent years. Commentators have shifted their
positions along with incidents and with rising or diminishing death tolls. Two
recent instances can be cited. Neutralisation of seven Maoists in Gadchiroli
district of Maharashtra on 17 February, for instance, underlined that
advancement of the state and weakening of the Maoists. However, following two
Maoist attacks within a fortnight in Chhattisgarh that killed 20 security force
personnel in February and March 2014 in Dantewada and Suka districts, the
narrative shifted and the potency of the extremists was reconfirmed. The
Maoists, who appeared to have previously weakened, have resurfaced as a real
threat to the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in certain states.
Much of these
fluctuations in analyses owe their origin to the states’ claims of success
against the extremists. There is no denying the fact that the security forces
have indeed made some advances in the Maoist-affected theatres. The most usual
parameter to judge this is the dip in violence in recent years. Compared to 2010,
when 1,005 civilians and security forces were killed in extremist attacks, 394
deaths occurred in 2013. Additionally, combined with figures of killings of
Maoist cadres, the number of surrenders as well as occasional confirmations
from the outfit, the CPI -Maoist's
capacity to orchestrate violence has been interpreted as having declined.
If these
conclusions are true, how does one interpret the 28 February and 11 March
attacks in Chhattisgarh? Are these attacks only aberrations and constitute
desperate attempts by the extremists to reiterate their presence, more so
before the elections? Or do they indicate that the success of the state was
more of a tactical favour granted by the extremists and hence, the lull in
violence was merely temporary?
While the
assertion that Maoists have indeed killed less civilians and security forces in
recent years is sustainable, whether this decline in extremist violence is
demonstrative of augmented capacities of the state remains a relevant question.
With particular reference to the 11 March attack, the security force
establishment has argued in defence of the ambushed Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF) team, vouching for its bravery. While some arguments have tried to
locate Maoist successes in the violation of standard operating procedures (SOPs)
by the security force personnel, the CRPF chief has stated that SOPs are not
sacrosanct and can be improvised if situations demand. Similarly, criticisms
regarding lack of intelligence and coordination between the central and the
state police have all been rebuffed.
If all is
well with the mode of operations, why are the security forces regularly falling
prey to attacks by a so called weak and demoralised extremist outfit? The
answer to this seemingly complicated question is relatively simple. The state, with
all its instrumentalities of power, has failed to dominate the extremism-affected
territory under question. Blame it either on the lack of adequate strength of
security force personnel or a cohesive strategy to dislodge the extremists, the
fact remains that much of the territory which report incidents of violence
continues to remain under the grip of the extremists.
Either the
state's success of neutralising key Maoist leaders through encounters, arrests
and surrenders or its inflicting of losses through disruption of means of
communication and logistics has not enlarged its writ into the ungoverned
territories. As a result, security force raids into extremist-held territories,
while making impressive media headlines, have not converted those areas into
state-only areas. The lack of a strategy to gradually expand the state's
domination is also the reason why the development initiatives of the state have
failed to win over the tribals. One cannot expect to have loyalists in areas
that are controlled by one’s adversary. And in such areas under extremist
domination, the losses undergone by the outfit are recovered fairly rapidly. This
is precisely the reason why the statement of the Union Home Minister Sushil
Kumar Shinde that the state will ‘take revenge’ for the 11 March attack in
Chhattisgarh appears hollow.
A few hours
after the 11 March attack, a social network page, ostensibly supportive of the
extremists, uploaded a picture of a bloodied Indian map along with a gun
totting rebel. "Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics
with bloodshed," Mao Zedong's famous line, was scribbled across the
picture. The picture is a pointer towards the future. The Maoist war against
the state, as long as it lasts, will be bloody. The least that the state can do
is to embark upon a strategy to ensure that the areas in which the Maoists
launch these bloody wars are shrunk on a gradual basis.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/combating-naxal-violence-transient-and-permanent-success-4341.html
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