Bibhu Prasad Routray
Rediff, 12 March 2014
There have
been two attacks by the Communist Party of India-Maoist within a fortnight in
Chhattisgarh, the worst left-wing extremism affected state in the country. While
five security force personnel were killed in the February 28 attack in
Dantewada district, 16 people including 11 belonging to the Central Reserve
Police Force, four belonging to the state police and a civilian were killed on
March 11 in Sukma district.
With the Lok
Sabha elections beginning in less than a month, these attacks would be linked
to extremist intent to escalate violence and demonstrate an ideological
opposition to the political process in the country. The fact remains, however, that
success of the extremists to carry out such attacks and failure of the state to
prevent them underline a much deeper malaise.
Available
reports indicate that a large number of Maoists (estimates ranging from 100 to 300)
attacked the security force personnel, part of a 45-member security team
deployed to provide security to the road construction work on National Highway 30
that connects the state capital Raipur to Sukma. Naxals surrounded the team
from both sides and fired indiscriminately. Within 15 minutes, the team had
been overpowered and the Naxals managed to carry away weapons and ammunition
from the dead and the injured.
Coming 10
months after the May 2013 attack in Darbha in which 27 people including
Congress party leaders and workers were killed, this constitutes a major achievement
for the extremists.
Like any
counter-insurgency operations, success in anti-Naxal operations need to fulfil
certain policy, strategic and tactical requirements. The strategies must be
formulated by the security experts and not by the political class and the
detached bureaucracy. The operations must remain a small commander's war, an
effort in which the state police establishment takes the lead and the central
police forces pitch in to provide necessary support.
The personnel
involved in the sustained operations need to be led intelligently and must have
access to ground level intelligence, quality arms and other logistics. The
political class must limit itself to provide broad policy directions and
demonstrate a steadfast intent to solve the problem and keep it undiluted from
partisan considerations.
It would
appear that in spite of a decade-long history of counter-Naxal operations in
the country (taking the 2004 formation of the CPI -Maoist as a
cut off year), none of these basic requirements have been fulfilled in any of
the conflict theatres. Under the circumstances, while a dip in violence may be
achieved as a result of a tactical favour granted by the extremists, a victory
is unimaginable.
Calling the
Chhattisgarh police a completely divided force may be a little too sweeping. However,
the fact remains that the recent times have witnessed rivalry and unhealthy
competition affecting group solidarity, a key component in counter-insurgency
theatres. Senior IPS officers in
the state have squabbled bitterly laying claims to the post of director general
of police in the past months, after the incumbent DGP retired in January 2014.
Intelligence
gathering capacities of the police have been questioned by the senior police
officers. A senior police official has accused an ADG and DIG in charge of
the state's intelligence branch of turning it into a personal fiefdom and
thereby seriously affecting its operations.
Such
divisions merely accentuates to the existing capacity crunch. Data reveals that
Chhattisgarh has a police density of 31.8 policemen per 100 square kilometres, amounting
to roughly a lone policeman managing three square kilometre area. In the
inaccessible and remote Bastar division, police presence is expected to be even
poorer. In comparison, in terms of sheer numerical strength, other Naxal-affected
states like Bihar have a density of 70.8
and Jharkhand 71.5.
Chhattisgarh
has managed to improve its total police strength from 23,350 in 2005 to 42,975
in 2012. However, even this near doubling up is clearly not enough. Bihar and
Jharkhand with much less geographical area have much larger police force.
In addition, in
Chhattisgarh over 26 percent vacancy exists in the SSP /SP/deputy SP
level and another 21 percent in the inspector/sub-inspector level demonstrating
an acute shortage of officers both at the leadership as well as operational
level. To expect such a weak, depleted and demoralised police force to lead the
anti-Naxal operations and emerge victorious is inconceivable.
Not
surprisingly a Chhattisgarh senior police officer summed up, "We have
effectively outsourced the counter-Naxal operations to the central forces."
With the central forces, duty bound to play the role of a supporter or force
enabler and certainly not that of a lead force, the fight against the Naxals is
marked by enormous confusion and operational frailty.
The recent
attacks are as much a failure of the state government as that of New Delhi New Delhi Raipur
While Singh
issued a customary statement underlining his resolve to bring the culprits to
book, his Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde chose to continue with his holidays
in the United States
All Naxal-affected
states demonstrate similar police as well as governance incapacities. Odd
occasions of success and temporary dip in Naxal violence notwithstanding, the
states have utterly failed to dominate and make their presence felt over areas
under the extremist domination.
Similar to
the November 2013 assembly elections in Chhattisgarh, deployment of a large
number of security forces may be able to minimise extremist violence during the
upcoming elections. However, securing a victory against the Naxals, unless the
current force and governance dispositions are drastically altered by the new
government in New Delhi
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