Bibhu Prasad Routray
Al Arabiya News, 5 July 2011
Within the last two weeks, two important developments -- a defection and a killing -- have taken place within the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), more popular by its colloquial name, the Pakistani Taliban. These incidents have a significantly weakening impact on the movement, which is responsible for some 4,500 deaths in Pakistan since its 2007 formation.
Reports indicate that more and more TTP commanders are switching sides to become “Good (Afghan) Taliban,” which in the long run is bound to have some impact on the TTP’s capacity to carry out its violent campaign within Pakistan. On the other hand, the enforcement of the Good (Afghan) Taliban, which exclusively focuses on Afghanistan for its violence, does not augur well for the latter.
In the second half of June 2011, a 39-year old TTP commander Fazal Saeed Utezai (also referred to as Fazal Saeed Haqqani), dropped out of the movement indicating his opposition to the outfit’s continued use of suicide attackers against civilians, market areas and mosques. In a media interview, Saeed lamented, “Islam does not allow killings of innocent civilians in suicide attacks.” He compared what TTP does in Pakistan to “what US troops are doing in Afghanistan.”
Saeed, with significant influence in the lower Kurram tribal agency, adjoining North Waziristan, defected with “hundreds of supporters” and went on to form his own splinter group, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Islami Pakistan. He has since asserted that his fight against the Americans would continue, but has not specified whether Pakistani state continues to remain an enemy for him. Indications are that he has switched sides from the TTP to become a part or ally of the Haqqani network, an affiliate of the Afghan Taliban, which has extended its influence into the Kurram agency.
Saeed’s defection considerably weakens the TTP, while swelling the ranks of the pro-Pakistan government Afghan Taliban, which already has militant leaders like Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan and Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan. This group opposes attacks on the Pakistani security forces and civilian targets. TTP has since criticised Saeed for having sold himself to the Pakistani state.
The second important incident was the 27 June assassination of senior commander Shakirullah Shakir, the head of the TTP’s suicide bombing squad. Unidentified gunmen killed Shakir near Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan, as he rode a motorcycle. Bullets were sprayed on him from a vehicle with tinted windows.
Shakir served as a close aide of Qari Hussain, TTP’s trainer of suicide bombers. Serving as the outfit’s spokesperson for sometime, Shakir had claimed that his outfit has trained more than 1000 suicide bombers in North Waziristan. In May this year, Shakir had issued a statement threatening Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry with “dire consequences” if he accepted the conviction of the TTP activists who were awarded death sentence by the Lahore High Court for attacking former president Pervez Musharraf. Shakir’s death is a definite blow to the TTP and it is likely to impact the suicide campaign of the TTP against the Pakistani state.
Experts believe that TTP’s current strength has dwindled since the August 2009 killing of its commander Baitullah Mehsud in a US drone attack. Since then, under the new chief Hakimullah Mehsud, who served as a driver for Baitullah, the organisation has struggled to keep its commanders united.
Hakimullah is largely perceived to be a trigger happy and juvenile commander and does not enjoy same status in the eyes of other senior TTP members such as Qari Hussain, Noor Saeed, Maulvi Azmatullah Mehsud, and Rais Khan Mehsud alias Azam Tariq. There is a strong indication that he is continuing to lose control over his local commanders and the affiliate groups. For example, the TTP faction led by Tariq Afridi in Darra Adamkhel and another faction led by Omar Khalid alias Abdul Wali in Mohmand, are operating completely independent of Hakimullah’s command.
Terrorist organisations to be effective are known to provide maximum autonomy to their local chapters. However, for the TTP it is not just “lack of knowledge” of the activities undertaken by its chapters, but appears to be a serious problem of “lack of control.” As a result, while suicide attacks are being disowned by the TTP, its local chapters are owning them up, much to the embarrassment of the parent outfit.
On 11 June, twin bomb blasts ripped through Peshawar’s Khyber supermarket killing over 42 persons. A small blast was triggered by a timed device planted in the bathroom of a hotel. As people gathered close to the site of the explosion, a suicide bomber riding a motorbike blew him self up nearby. TTP chief spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan denied the organisation’s involvement asserting that his organisation is against the targeting of civilians. But subsequently spokesman of TTP’s Darra Adamkhel chapter claimed that they had orchestrated the attack.
A huge element of distrust has continued within the TTP ranks since Baitullah’s death. It is largely believed that intervention by Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Afghan mujahideen fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani, had prevented an armed confrontation between the various factions of would-be Taliban chiefs after Baitullah’s death. Sirajuddin had told the various TTP leaders that they must save their bullets for their enemies.
Sirajuddin’s intervention prevented an armed rivalry between the TTP factions, but has not really led to a warming up of ties between leader Hakimullah Mehsud and his second-in-command Weliur Rahman Mehsud. The latter is in charge of the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan and commands the loyalty of about 7000 to 10,000 fighters. Sources indicate that Hakimullah and Weliur have barely met in months. So much is the suspicion that meetings, if any between these two, have been arranged in the presence of third party commanders and on the specific condition that none present at the meeting would carry weapons.
The state of affairs presents an excellent opportunity for Pakistan to exploit. However, the intended stabilisation of Pakistan through a process that weakens the TTP, but enforces the Afghan Taliban, will have larger repercussions on Afghanistan’s peace and stability.
http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/07/05/156233.html
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Showing posts with label Al Qaeda Osama bin Laden Abbotabad Taliban Afghanistan Lashkar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Al Qaeda Osama bin Laden Abbotabad Taliban Afghanistan Lashkar. Show all posts
Thursday, July 7, 2011
Friday, May 6, 2011
Redefining the Af-Pak endgame
Shanthie Mariet D'Souza & Bibhu Prasad Routray
Business Standard, May 7, 2011
On May 3, a charged atmosphere greeted the members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee as they met to discuss the endgame in Afghanistan. Although the meeting, the first in the series of six, had been scheduled ahead of the May 2 killing of Osama bin Laden, the new ground situations weighed heavily on the minds of the Congressmen. Contrary to what appears in the media and part of the chatter that the US is now once again ready to abandon the region, the meeting took serious note of the new challenges in Af-Pak and the unaccomplished counter-terrorism efforts that must be completed before a total pull-out is effected. Osama’s killing has indeed renewed a vigorous debate in the US on the role and policy objectives in post-Osama Afghanistan.
“After Osama bin Laden, what” was always a crucial question even when the elusive terrorist leader was alive and not necessarily running for his life. The poser has assumed an ever greater significance after the circumstances surrounding his killing. The demonstrative impact, with far-reaching consequences for the peace and stability in the region, is quite clear. His elimination is said to have sapped the morale of Al Qaeda, has boosted the image of the US presidency and prospects for Obama’s re-election bid. At the same time, it has underlined the troubled US-Pakistan counter-terrorism cooperation of the last decade.
Accusations of collusion between sections of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies with the world’s top terrorist have been hurled not just by the Americans but even by the Pakistani media. In reaction, the Pakistani army, which allowed the country’s president and prime minister to do the explaining in the initial days, has started talking tough. However, it is clear that the warnings asking the US not to repeat its misadventure and to scale down its military and intelligence presence in Pakistan remains a poorly calibrated tactic to deflect domestic and global criticism and, more importantly, a desperate survival strategy for what was perceived to be a well-organised, cohesive and disciplined force. Pakistan today is a far weaker and vulnerable state than it was when the hunt for bin Laden began, with chronic political and economic problems.
Painting Pakistan black, however, can never be a part of the strategy. For many years, the country has been known as the fountainhead of terrorism worldwide. Although it has participated with some spirit in the war on terror and has been the victim of attacks by the Pakistani Taliban, its fetish for using terrorism as a matter of state policy remains insatiable, which in turn has led to severe strains on its polity, society and economy. The nexus between elements in Pakistan and Osama obviously goes far deeper than the grieving activists of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (previously Lashkar-e-Toiba) who offered prayers for him on the streets of Karachi on May 3. The time, therefore, is ripe for dealing with the organised threat Pakistan poses to the world at large and addressing issues such as schisms within the military, intelligence and civilian administration and the increased radicalisation of Pakistani society. Calls have been made in the US to stop providing aid to Pakistan for harbouring Osama. But the aim needs to be far deeper than that. America’s engagement in the Af-Pak region is far more a necessity today than ever before.
This makes implementing the calls for an accelerated “pack-and-run” strategy for the US troops in Afghanistan rather difficult. A drawdown of US forces is slated to begin in July 2011, which will also mark the beginning of the process when international forces would confine themselves to counter-terrorism while gradually allowing Afghan forces to do the bulk of the counter-insurgency duties. While Obama would like to stick to the date in his promise of December 2009 and augment his new-found domestic public support, the altered ground situation after Osama’s death continues to pose several challenges.
Killing Osama, a figurehead of the Al Qaeda for many terrorist outfits around the world, is a definite blow to the movement. However, given the fact that Al Qaeda has functioned as a loosely amorphous organisation with sub-contracting to local chapters and franchisees, the killing of its leader may have only limited impact on the operational capacities of the global jihadi network. A suicide attack that claimed the lives of 18 police officers in Iraq on May 5 could be the beginning of a wave of revenge attacks by Al Qaeda franchises. The Lashkar-e-Toiba, known as an affiliate of the Al Qaeda-Taliban so far, with a global reach and ambitions, has made a bid and could fill the vacuum created by Osama’s death. The Lashkar has increased its presence in Afghanistan lately and made renewed calls for a global jihad.
More than the drawdown of US forces, which in any event is slated to continue at least till July 2014, what would have a lasting impact on Afghanistan’s stability is the culmination of the reconciliation process. What would, thus, be interesting, is to see if the US will use enough force or diplomatic skill to get the Quetta Shura of the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table, before it ventures on a retreating mission. Though the Taliban has announced the launch of its spring offensive, there is speculation that Osama’s death could advance the effort to reach a political resolution to the Afghan war, because it might convince the Taliban and Al Qaeda to come to the negotiating table.
The fact remains, however, that without dismantling the sanctuaries and terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and breaking the linkages of these groups with Al Qaeda, an early end to the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be conceived. The collusion of elements of the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies with these groups would ensure that the Afghan conflict lingers beyond 2014 and Pakistan is able to accomplish its mission of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan. This makes it doubly crucial for the US to address the anomalies Pakistan poses to the world rather than declaring victory and going home, as it did in Iraq.
The end goal, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the Al Qaeda remains an unfinished project even after the death of Osama bin Laden. In the moments of euphoria, a partially-finished task should not be conceived as a full-blown victory.
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shanthie-mariet-dsouzabibhu-prasad-routray-redefiningaf-pak-endgame/434748/
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Business Standard, May 7, 2011
On May 3, a charged atmosphere greeted the members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee as they met to discuss the endgame in Afghanistan. Although the meeting, the first in the series of six, had been scheduled ahead of the May 2 killing of Osama bin Laden, the new ground situations weighed heavily on the minds of the Congressmen. Contrary to what appears in the media and part of the chatter that the US is now once again ready to abandon the region, the meeting took serious note of the new challenges in Af-Pak and the unaccomplished counter-terrorism efforts that must be completed before a total pull-out is effected. Osama’s killing has indeed renewed a vigorous debate in the US on the role and policy objectives in post-Osama Afghanistan.
“After Osama bin Laden, what” was always a crucial question even when the elusive terrorist leader was alive and not necessarily running for his life. The poser has assumed an ever greater significance after the circumstances surrounding his killing. The demonstrative impact, with far-reaching consequences for the peace and stability in the region, is quite clear. His elimination is said to have sapped the morale of Al Qaeda, has boosted the image of the US presidency and prospects for Obama’s re-election bid. At the same time, it has underlined the troubled US-Pakistan counter-terrorism cooperation of the last decade.
Accusations of collusion between sections of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies with the world’s top terrorist have been hurled not just by the Americans but even by the Pakistani media. In reaction, the Pakistani army, which allowed the country’s president and prime minister to do the explaining in the initial days, has started talking tough. However, it is clear that the warnings asking the US not to repeat its misadventure and to scale down its military and intelligence presence in Pakistan remains a poorly calibrated tactic to deflect domestic and global criticism and, more importantly, a desperate survival strategy for what was perceived to be a well-organised, cohesive and disciplined force. Pakistan today is a far weaker and vulnerable state than it was when the hunt for bin Laden began, with chronic political and economic problems.
Painting Pakistan black, however, can never be a part of the strategy. For many years, the country has been known as the fountainhead of terrorism worldwide. Although it has participated with some spirit in the war on terror and has been the victim of attacks by the Pakistani Taliban, its fetish for using terrorism as a matter of state policy remains insatiable, which in turn has led to severe strains on its polity, society and economy. The nexus between elements in Pakistan and Osama obviously goes far deeper than the grieving activists of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (previously Lashkar-e-Toiba) who offered prayers for him on the streets of Karachi on May 3. The time, therefore, is ripe for dealing with the organised threat Pakistan poses to the world at large and addressing issues such as schisms within the military, intelligence and civilian administration and the increased radicalisation of Pakistani society. Calls have been made in the US to stop providing aid to Pakistan for harbouring Osama. But the aim needs to be far deeper than that. America’s engagement in the Af-Pak region is far more a necessity today than ever before.
This makes implementing the calls for an accelerated “pack-and-run” strategy for the US troops in Afghanistan rather difficult. A drawdown of US forces is slated to begin in July 2011, which will also mark the beginning of the process when international forces would confine themselves to counter-terrorism while gradually allowing Afghan forces to do the bulk of the counter-insurgency duties. While Obama would like to stick to the date in his promise of December 2009 and augment his new-found domestic public support, the altered ground situation after Osama’s death continues to pose several challenges.
Killing Osama, a figurehead of the Al Qaeda for many terrorist outfits around the world, is a definite blow to the movement. However, given the fact that Al Qaeda has functioned as a loosely amorphous organisation with sub-contracting to local chapters and franchisees, the killing of its leader may have only limited impact on the operational capacities of the global jihadi network. A suicide attack that claimed the lives of 18 police officers in Iraq on May 5 could be the beginning of a wave of revenge attacks by Al Qaeda franchises. The Lashkar-e-Toiba, known as an affiliate of the Al Qaeda-Taliban so far, with a global reach and ambitions, has made a bid and could fill the vacuum created by Osama’s death. The Lashkar has increased its presence in Afghanistan lately and made renewed calls for a global jihad.
More than the drawdown of US forces, which in any event is slated to continue at least till July 2014, what would have a lasting impact on Afghanistan’s stability is the culmination of the reconciliation process. What would, thus, be interesting, is to see if the US will use enough force or diplomatic skill to get the Quetta Shura of the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table, before it ventures on a retreating mission. Though the Taliban has announced the launch of its spring offensive, there is speculation that Osama’s death could advance the effort to reach a political resolution to the Afghan war, because it might convince the Taliban and Al Qaeda to come to the negotiating table.
The fact remains, however, that without dismantling the sanctuaries and terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and breaking the linkages of these groups with Al Qaeda, an early end to the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be conceived. The collusion of elements of the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies with these groups would ensure that the Afghan conflict lingers beyond 2014 and Pakistan is able to accomplish its mission of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan. This makes it doubly crucial for the US to address the anomalies Pakistan poses to the world rather than declaring victory and going home, as it did in Iraq.
The end goal, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the Al Qaeda remains an unfinished project even after the death of Osama bin Laden. In the moments of euphoria, a partially-finished task should not be conceived as a full-blown victory.
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shanthie-mariet-dsouzabibhu-prasad-routray-redefiningaf-pak-endgame/434748/
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