Indo-Pak relations: An empty score-sheet

Bibhu Prasad Routray

New Indian Express, 3 June 2012

What exactly has moved forward in the Indo-Pakistan relations in recent months? Even the ardent optimists would find it difficult to provide any evidence. On the contrary, the ‘difficulty’ that Pakistan continues to feign in taking pro-India measures are clear evidences that this ‘remarkable turnaround’ is little more than a exceptionally high dose of histrionics, comparable to a whiff of cool breeze that soothes a terminal patient, but is highly insufficient in providing a cure.

Some castles of hopes, at least on the Indian side, had been built on the home secretary-level talks between the two countries in Islamabad on May 24 and 25. The last line of the 215-word press release from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) read, “A revised visa agreement is expected to be signed. This revised agreement inter-alia introduces the concept of group tourist visa, visa on arrival and a separate category of business visas.”

Although the joint statement issued at the end of the meeting referred to the “finalisation of the visa agreement” which both sides “agreed to sign at an early date”, the reality was, only a truncated agreement — a visa-free territory of 400 m radius at the Attari-Wagah border and an extended list of importable items from India — was the end result of the two-day meeting. The 400-m visa-free radius would provide some logistical comfort to the officials and truckers; and most of the items in the extended import list are already in the list of importable items through Wagah.

Inability to seek “internal approvals” remains the bane of the civilian government in Pakistan, or so it claims. India had gone prepared for the visa agreement. Pakistan side, however, maintained “the agreement will be signed” once the “internal approvals” are in place. On May 27, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, holding a news conference in Karachi, announced that the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC), a coalition of 40 religious groups, would not allow Pakistan to become an “Indian market”. The DPC plans to hold a series of rallies against India and the US across the country over the coming months.

Regular Pakistan watchers would not miss the striking similarity in Pakistan’s stand over issues like the liberalised visa regime and the grant of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India. In both the cases, there is an ‘agreement in principle’ in the Pakistan cabinet, and the issues were duly highlighted as examples of the warming up of the bilateral relations, and yet the Pakistani side was unable to move forward. The MFN sanction which was supposed to have been granted to India last year, is now scheduled for 2013. And curiously, just like the liberalised visa regime agreement, the MFN issue too has faced stiff opposition from Saeed.

The joint statement of May 25 also referred to an “expeditious execution” of “pending red notices”. The Indian list of 50 fugitives includes Saeed, Maulana Masood Azhar, Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon. In the coming months, the CBI and Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) would discuss the issue of red notices. However, even as the Indian home secretary spoke of letting Pakistan keep the head money of Rs 56 crore on Saeed and hand him over, Pakistan interior minister Rahman Malik advised India to stop levelling allegations against his country.

Recently, American Congressman Dana Rohrabacher pooh-poohed the civilian surge in Pakistan saying that President Asif Ali Zardari “is either in league with the military or under their domination”. Rohrabacher’s well-known eccentricity notwithstanding, one can hardly disagree with such an assessment. Starting with the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, this civilian government has wilfully carried the Pakistani military on its shoulders. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is selectively disrespectful of the court orders on prosecuting Zardari on corruption cases, and highly respectful of the role of the judiciary when acting on Saeed and Azhar.

Optimists would make a case for patience. Regular engagement, they say, would eventually break the old walls and create new opportunities. While it is certainly not easy to put behind the decades-long enmity, it is also undeniable that progress needs to be judged from the incremental steps that takes care of the Indian concerns. And these are the missing links in the relationship.

A lot many analysts believe that the thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations may have been a result of pressures from Washington. However, the opposite could also be true. India, by attempting to normalise its relations with its western neighbour, could be adding to the latter’s posture of obstinacy against the US/NATO in Afghanistan.

http://expressbuzz.com/voices/Indo-Pak-relations-An-empty-score-sheet/397169.html

Assam: Clueless in the NC Hills

Bibhu Prasad Routray

South Asia Intelligence Review, vol.6, no. 49, June 16, 2008

http://satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_49.htm#assessment2

Counter-insurgency (CI) operations in Assam have shown little evidence of sustained success, both against the dominant United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and against peripheral groups such as the Black Widow (BW). Even as ULFA tends to consume a bulk of the state’s CI efforts, Districts such as the North Cachar (NC) Hills have, over the past five years, continued to remain affected by a ruthless localised stream of terror by the BW. Over these years, little change has been noticeable in the state’s abilities to restore order in this remote corner of Assam.
For a cadre strength of 300, out of which only a third is believed to be armed, BW’s ability to dominate Assam’s third largest District, spanning over 4,890 square kilometres, remains a fact. Past incidents suggest that the outfit, barely five years into existence, has not only been able to spread a complex web of terror across this District, but has, time and again, carried out terrorist strikes with extraordinary impunity.
The first five months of the current year have demonstrated a typical pattern in the attacks executed by the BW. Most of these attacks have targeted the Lumding-Silchar-Jiribam gauge conversion project of the Northeast Frontier Railways (NFR) in the NC Hills District. Portions of the 214 kilometre gauge hill section from Silchar to Lumding junction, meanders through the District. Such attacks are part of the outfit’s effort to interdict work on the East-West Railway Corridor and other railway projects in the District.
On May 15, BW militants fired on a two-coach patrol train between the Mupa and Kalachand Stations in the NC Hills District. The driver of the train, N.N. Bora, was killed, while three others were injured, in the incident. Three days earlier, on May 12, two persons were killed and another injured when BW militants attacked railway workers engaged at a construction site at Migrendisa under the Haflong Police Station. This attack occurred only a day after the attack by the BW on railway quarters at Thoibasti, where eight labourers had been killed. Earlier on March 24, three persons, including two railway employees, were killed and two others wounded, when BW terrorists carried out an attack on the Harangajao Railway Station. Militants used grenades and fired at least 90 rounds of AK-47 and INSAS rifle ammunition during the attack.
Following the May 15 attack, the Northeast Frontier Railways (NFR) suspended rail operations along the Silchar and Lumding Junctions and evacuated its project staff from the District. The suspension of rail operations not only led to an acute shortage of basic goods in the District, but also blocked the single rail route used to reach goods to roadheads to the States of Manipur and Mizoram.
Other major attacks by the BW in the NC Hills District during the current year include:
May 15: Suspected BW militants hijacked five cement-laden trucks and subsequently killed the five drivers and their five helpers near Krumgminglangsu village.
February 19: Five employees of a private cement factory, Vinay Cements, were killed while another was injured in an attack by the BW militants near Umrangsu town.
February 11: Four persons, including an Assam Police Battalion soldier, were killed and two more injured when BW militants ambushed a convoy of the North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. Officials, 20 kilometres from Umrangsu in the NC Hills District.
January 14: Five persons, two Security Force (SF) personnel and three civilians were killed and another person was injured by BW militants in Umrangsu Town.
The BW had announced a three-month ceasefire on March 25, 2008, a day after its cadres carried out the attack on the Harangajao Railway Station, virtually replicating the example set by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), when the Bodo outfit had declared a ceasefire on October 8, 2004, after an orgy of violence claiming 32 lives in Sonitpur and Dhubri Districts between October 2 and 5, 2004. The State Government, then, had chosen to ignore the NDFB’s offer. The NDFB, however, had stuck to its ceasefire declaration, eventually forcing the Government to change track in April 2005. The BW’s patience, however, did not last that long. While the reasons behind the declaration of the ceasefire by the BW were not too clear, the State Government’s refusal to reciprocate made the group look for an opportunity to break away from what suddenly seemed to be a tactical blunder.
SF operations have not achieved significant results against the BW, except for the odd killing or arrest. In one of the few successes, on March 22, 2008, the 'deputy commander-in-chief' of the outfit, Franky Dimasa, was arrested, far from the NC Hills, in the Fatasil Ambari area in Guwahati city. Subsequently, a success to which it laid no claim was nevertheless ascribed to the Army: the BW blamed the Army for having carried out an attack on its cadres at Harelu on May 10, in which 12 militants were killed. Interestingly, the 8th Sikh Regiment of the Army did admit to a heavy exchange of fire between its personnel and BW cadres in the said location, but denied that any militant was killed. The BW used this pretext to revoke its self-declared ceasefire and initiated its latest killing spree. The Army remains categorical that no killings had occurred on that fateful day at Harelu and the BW’s claim is only a ploy to resume its activities.
Following the May 15 attack on the patrol train that led to the suspension of train services throughout the District, the BW came out with another face-saving measure. On May 19, it lifted its ‘ban’ on railway project activities and said that the evacuated railway staff could return to the District. It further described the gesture as a commitment to peace in the District and squarely blaming the State Government and the Army for the escalation in violence.
High profile militant attacks have invariably elicited war cries from the official establishment in Assam and the present instance was no different. Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, who heads the Unified Command Structure in the State, rebuffed BW’s renewed peace offer and announced that the Army had been instructed to conduct combing operations targeting the militants. SF presence in the District was augmented by moving in troops of the 57 Mountain Brigade posted at Masimpur in the neighbouring Cachar District to NC Hills. Other measures announced included:
Steps to rectify "operational weaknesses" in the counter-insurgency campaign by setting up a ‘local’ Unified Command Structure in association with the 3 Corps. The Unified Command Structure that plans and executes counter-insurgency operations in Assam does not cover N C Hills. Troops deployed in the District come under the Rangapahar-based 3 Corps (in Nagaland), unlike the Tezpur-based 4 Corps of the Army (in Assam), that combats insurgency in the rest of the State.
Deployment of 2,000 additional ex-servicemen in the District to ensure the security of railway personnel and those working for the broad gauge conversion and the East-West corridor projects in vulnerable stretches.
Identification of 57 points in the Lumding-Badarpur Hills section of the railway project in the District as most sensitive. Security measures have since reportedly been tightened in 52 of these points.
There is ample reason to believe that such announcements are mere fire-fighting measures, intended to pacify certain quarters, without sufficiently enabling the SFs to take on and neutralize the militants. Within two days of announcing the deployment of 2,000 ex-servicemen in the District, the Chief Minister, on May 20, declared that the "response to such a proposal has not been good" and hence, the Government would now "form an auxiliary force with 1,000 surrendered militants." It needs mention that the use of surrendered ULFA (SULFA) cadres in CI operations has been the source of severe controversy in Assam.
As has been previously argued in SAIR, apart from the geographical advantage that this hilly District offers to the militants, persisting weaknesses in the Police administration continue to undermine the capacity of the SFs to restore a hold over the law and order situation.
This District has 175 Police personnel per 100,000 population but, crucially, less than seven Police personnel per 100 square kilometres. Six reserve forests and vast stretches of unclassified forest areas, accounting for 4,630 square kilometres – roughly 95 percent of the District’s territory – make NC Hills a veritable nightmare for such a thinly spread Police force. The entire District is administered by only four Police Stations and seven ‘non-sanctioned’ Police outposts. Vast stretches of the District’s territory thus remain entirely un-policed, serving as free hunting grounds for the militants. The fear of the marauding militants, coupled with the highly inadequate resources available with the Police, makes it almost impossible to establish any channels of effective intelligence and information. In the words of a former Police officer who served in the District, "The Police knows nothing. Even when it does, it is not capable of doing anything."
A year ago, in June 2007, the NC Hills District had hogged news headlines following the killing of two local high-profile politicians belonging to the Congress Party at the hands of the BW. Both politicians were engaged in a negotiation at one of the outfit’s hideouts, asking it to scale down its extortion demand before the polls to the Autonomous District Council (ADC) elections. The killing of the two led to the postponement of the elections. Later the Congress Party withdrew from the fray and the Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) combine emerged victorious.
Following the June 2007 killing, the Assam Government had rushed in additional Central Para-military Force (CPMF) companies into the District and had announced several measures, including the setting up of four new Police Stations and a ‘full-scale Army flush-out’ operation in the NC Hills and the neighbouring Karbi Anglong District. As usual, by the time the dust settled down, the Government suffered a memory lapse. None of the announced measures, except for the transfer of the District Police chief, were actually implemented. The ‘full-scale Army flush-out’ was translated into a routine sweep operation in some of the militant strongholds, making little or no impact on the outfit’s capacities. The ‘sanitised’ areas quickly deteriorated, once again, into ‘liberated’ zones.
CI operations targeting the BW cadres are reportedly continuing in NC Hills. However, not a single BW cadre has either been arrested or killed so far, since the May 15 attack. The movement of trains during the night and work on the Railway projects continue to be suspended. However, the BW has also not been involved in any significant attack in the District, although some activities have been reported from neighbouring Meghalaya. A clueless Government of Assam continues to debate its response to the outfit’s ceasefire offer. In the consequent stalemate, an eerie silence that favours the BW’s future consolidation prevails over the NC Hills.

Manipur: The State Abdicates

Bibhu Prasad Routray

South Asia Intelligence Review, vol.6, no.43, May 5, 2008

http://satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_43.htm#assessment2
Manipur continues to be affected by the activities of a large number of militant/insurgent outfits divided on ethnic lines with competing demands. Keeping the situation in view, sustained counter insurgency operations have been mounted in close coordination between the State Government and the Central security forces/agencies. As a result, the number of militants/ insurgents killed or arrested has gone up significantly during the year.
– Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual report 2007-08
The MHA assessment of the state of militancy clearly seeks to underplay the realities of the ground situation. Year after year, the state of militancy in Manipur has displayed all the characteristics of intractability. With 408 deaths in the year 2007, Manipur remained the second most conflict ridden State in the northeast (behind Assam with 437 fatalities) according to Institute for Conflict Management data; in year 2008 (till April 28), with 162 fatalities the State had even surpassed the most conflict prone Jammu and Kashmir (153 fatalities) and to become the most violent theatre of conflict in the country. Irrespective of whether the current level of violence is sustained through the year, the state of affairs points to a scenario of all-pervasive hopelessness in Manipur. While the MHA can continue to live in a make-believe world of imagined gratification, it is clear that more than two decades of counter-insurgency operations in Manipur continue to be marked by serious shortcomings.
All the nine Districts of the state including both the Valley (four Districts) and the Hill areas (five Districts) have remained affected, not just by militant activities, but by unrelenting violence, reported from every one of the 59 Police Stations in the State. The unending militant violence has severely impacted on the very limited local capacities for governance, justice administration, and the provision of minimal security to citizens. Militants have not only extorted and abducted with impunity, but have also imposed diktats on issues ranging from food, dress, language, cultural and religious practices, education etc., most of which have been complied with by the hapless population. The militant influence has not been confined to the remote corners of the State, but is on full display in the ‘fortified’ State capital, Imphal, with attacks on the residences of ministers and Members of the State Legislative Assembly (MLAs). On March 8, 2008, for instance, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) militants drove up to the heavily guarded Manipur Assembly complex and lobbed a bomb that exploded without causing any fatalities. Again, on April 24, at least five persons, including a woman, were injured when a remote controlled improvised explosive device (IED) fitted on a scooter was exploded by the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) at the Babupara VIP colony near the Chief Minister's bungalow in capital Imphal.
The capacities of about 15 active militant outfits with an estimated cadre-strength of 10,000 remain rooted in factors such as support from civilians and the intelligentsia, a highly efficient intelligence network, hideouts in neighbouring Myanmar and arms supply from South-east Asia. The relentless hostility between the Hills inhabited by the tribals and the Valley dominated by the Hindu Meitei population, has acted as an enormous force multiplier for the extremist groups. More or less sustained counter-insurgency operations, for over two-decades, have had very little impact on the capacities of the militant outfits.
In January 2008, the Army authorities claimed to have dislodged the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the most potent outfit primarily active in the Valley areas, from its last bastion inside the State, the New Samtal area spread over 1,000 square kilometres in the south-western Chandel District. The claims followed the usual rigmarole involving visits by various Army officials and the Governor of the State, who made assurances that civil administration would soon be restored in the area. Coming after nearly one and half years’ of intermittent campaigns to end militant control over the area, the restoration of security force (SF) dominance in New Samtal was hailed as a decisive blow to UNLF capacities, with promises that these would be further diminished in the following months.
Within three months, however, the gains appear to be dissipating. Far from a restoration of civil administration in the area, what has actually occurred is that UNLF cadres, who had simply vacated the villages and retreated into the forest areas, or had crossed over into the safety of adjoining Myanmar, in the wake of security force operations, are now returning to the area, and have already managed ambushes on the security force contingents on two occasions. On May 1, 2008, the UNLF’s ‘293 battalion’ carried out two attacks on the para-military Assam Rifles (AR) personnel. At least two AR personnel were killed and four others injured as a result of the attack on three AR water collection vehicles at Phairengkot village. The second attack on an AR post at Molcham did not result in any casualty.
Although both Police and the Army sources in Manipur insist that the coordination between various security agencies is smooth and trouble free, there are several points of friction. Acute differences between the Police and the Army have a history of at least four years. Beginning with the July 2004 Manorama Devi episode, assessments of militancy by the Army and the Police have diverged markedly. In fact, the State Government’s decision to withdraw the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) from the Imphal municipal areas was reached at the behest of the Police, despite stiff opposition from the Army. Subsequently, the Police refused to abide by the Army’s October 2005 Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki militant groups, and continued to target Kuki militants under the ceasefire. The 2004 establishment of a ‘Unified Command Structure’ notwithstanding, frequent ‘ego clashes’ between the Army and the Police are said to have hampered the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations. The Army has been accused of refusing to take orders from the Police during joint operations. Similarly, the Army complains of receiving very little support from the Police, especially during its operations in the Hill Districts. Police operations against the militants have remained mostly confined to the Valley.
Successes in counter-insurgency campaigns in conflict theatres in the country, including Punjab and more recent successes in Tripura, Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh, have underlined the crucial role of the State Police. While the Army and the central para-military forces (CPMFs) can play a supportive role, counter-insurgency operations need to be substantially Police-led, if they are to succeed. Unfortunately, the Police in Manipur have historically abdicated responsibility, leaving the Army and the CPMFs to lead from the front, resulting in numerous tactical successes, but enveloping strategic failure.
The MHA’s Police modernization programme has been under implementation in Manipur since 1969 and the programme aims at capacity building among the state Police force, especially to meet internal security challenges. Manipur has been classified as an ‘A’ category State under the programme and receives 100 per cent central assistance for Police modernization. Over the years, however, utilisation of the available central funds remains extremely poor. Accessible data indicates that the State spent 80 per cent of the INR 152.4 million in central funds released for 2004-05. However, utilization in the previous five years never exceeded 43 per cent. The release of the central funds has also been affected by the failure of the Police Department to submit projects.

Worse, the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) report on the Manipur Home Department for 2006-07 is a poor commentary on Police affairs in the State. The CAG audit found:
1) Shortfall of arms and ammunitions ranged from 17 to 100 per cent and from 37 to 95 per cent respectively, which hindered the capacity of the force to combat militancy.
2) There was 30 to 51 per cent shortage of vehicles, adversely impacting on the mobility of the Force.
3) There was 82 per cent vacancy in respect of technical posts in the forensic laboratory resulting in 73 to 82 per cent cases lying pending during 2002-07.
4) Although the Manipur Police Housing Corporation had spent only INR 70.2 million up to March 2007 out of INR 189.7 million placed (2002-07) at its disposal for construction of Police Stations, buildings and barracks, the Department had shown the entire amount as expenditure.
There is an acute shortage of residential buildings for Police personnel and the ‘satisfaction level’, as of March 2007, was only 11 per cent.
5) The objective of sharing/disseminating information with other Police organisations/CPMFs through the POLNET (the Satellite-based all India Police Telecommunication Network) system had not been achieved, despite an expenditure of INR 26.3 million.
The capacities of the Manipur Police have also been diminished as a result of a manpower shortfall in the force. In spite of the fact that Manipur has a fairly healthy Police-population ratio (Police personnel per 100,000 population) of 554 (the national average is 126) and Police density (Policemen per 100 square kilometre area) of 63.8 (national average is 44.4), the 17,708 strong Police force (sanctioned strength) suffers from a vacancy of 19.52 per cent. While the vacancy among the civil Police force component is a bearable 12 per cent, among the armed Police component it is over 20.68 per cent. Leadership Deficits are worse, and National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data indicates that vacancies among the armed Police are almost 69 per cent at the levels of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP)/ Superintendent of Police (SP)/ Additional SP/ Assistant SP/ Deputy SP; 25 per cent at the Inspector/ Sub-Inspector (SI) and Assistant SI (ASI) levels; and 20 per cent among the personnel in the ‘below ASI rank’ category [All data as of December 31, 2006]. Between 2002 and 2005, Manipur recruited just 823 constables and 10 sub-inspectors and assistant sub-inspectors. The bulk of the constable’s appointments (821 out of 823) were in 2005. Currently, the process of recruitment to SI an ASI posts is ongoing, and it will be a while before the new recruits are trained and assigned postings.
The failure of the Police to provide minimum security to civilians has resulted in some desperate moves recently. On May 2, 2008, the State Cabinet approved a plan to recruit 500 special Police officers (SPOs) and to arm them with .303 rifles to provide security against the militants in Heirok village of Thoubal District and Chajing village of Imphal West District. As per the plan, each of these SPOs would be provided with a monthly remuneration of INR 3,000 and would be required to stay at barracks to be constructed near these villages. The deployment will follow a month’s training in the use of arms.
In Manipur, the Village Voluntary Force (VVF) had played an effective role of resisting militant advances, notably that of the Naga National Council (NNC) during the 1960s and 1970s, in areas such as Ukhrul and Tamenglong. Many of these VVF cadres were later absorbed into the para-military Special Services Bureau (SSB), which was rechristened as Sasashtra Seema Bal (SSB) in 2007. However, the current move to appoint SPOs to checkmate the militants appears abrupt and was mostly influenced by appeals for arms by villagers of Heirok and Chanjing after two incidents of militant attacks on March 24 and April 23, which resulted in the killing of four persons. It is not clear what sort of resistance these ill-trained villagers with archaic arms would be able to put up against vastly superior militant cadres, nor is it clear whether this force would operate under Police or other SF command. It is also possible that the initial euphoria around the exploitation of a transient antipathy against militancy will die out, once the militants start eliminating these ‘sitting ducks’ and decamp with their weapons. The state’s agencies have been trying to provoke and spread popular discontent against militancy, but passing the responsibility of providing security to the villagers, unquestionably a function of the state, on to civilians is fraught with inherent dangers.
Sagacity does not appear to mark much of the State Government’s perspectives on counter-insurgency. On March 30, Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, responding to the allegations of staged encounter killings, declared that the militants in the state must die for Manipur to be saved. "The Government is being criticised for killing militants. But we have little choice but to kill them to protect lives and property", Singh retorted. While the strategy is debatable, the fact remains that the security force setup, especially the Police force, appear to be entirely unable to neutralise the militancy. Unless there is a near-miraculous reinvention of the capacities and orientation of the Police Force in the proximate future, Manipur’s tryst with anarchy appears to be interminable.