Bibhu Prasad Routray
New Indian Express, 14 August 2011
http://expressbuzz.com/magazine/achievements-delusional-in-anti-naxal-operations/303600.html
The Ministry of Home Affairs might have given itself a pat on the back after flaunting a reduction in Left wing extremism-related fatalities across the country. The reality, however, is that the military capacities among the Naxals remain undiminished. The dip in fatalities is merely a result of tactical and political compromises, which makes the so-called gains tenuous and consequently, reversible.
Parliament was told on August 3 that till July 15 this year, death among the civilians killed in Naxal-related violence has declined to 229 from 372 in the corresponding period last year. Similarly, fatalities among the security forces declined from 211 to 90. Let us examine if this reduction of over 38 per cent in civilian fatalities and 57 per cent among the security forces represents a much needed ‘turn around’ in the overall Naxal situation in the country.
In the first seven months of 2010, West Bengal recorded 261 civilian deaths. The fatalities have dipped dramatically in the corresponding period this year with only 34 deaths (an improvement of 227) among the civilians. Add the difference to this year’s figure and the data on civilian fatalities for the entire country even surpasses last year’s. Similarly, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal together accounted for 169 security force deaths in 2010’s first seven months. Only 43 deaths have been reported in the corresponding period this year. This difference of 126 explains the ‘improvement’ in the overall situation.
What is being argued in this article is that while the improvement in 2011 is numerically genuine, methods deployed for achieving this borders on strategic hara-kiri, providing the Maoists, and not the state, the upper hand.
From 34 deaths in 2008, West Bengal climbed to the top of the list of states affected by Naxal violence in 2010, with 425 fatalities. The down slide had taken place even when over 40 companies of Central forces had been deployed in the affected areas. The extent of Maoist domination was one of the factors that influenced the Election Commission’s decision to hold State legislative elections in April-May 2011 in six phases, supported by a deployment of 600 companies of central forces.
Within days of Mamata Banerjee’s coming to power, the Naxal violence disappeared. Since her oath taking, till the end of July, the state recorded only three civilian deaths, creating a smokescreen that the Naxals have either vanished or have turned peaceniks. Neither of these is true. The safe haven, which the Trinamool Congress government has provided the Naxals from neighbouring states in its tribal belt to settle their top leadership, to operate with absolute freedom and to increase their influence, precludes extremist violence. Security force operations both inside West Bengal as well as along the inter-state borders with Jharkhand and Orissa have been brought to a grinding halt. This explains the dip in civilian and security force fatalities. Sixty-one Naxalites were killed in West Bengal in 2010. Four more were neutralised in the first three months of 2011 and none since TMC took over.
West Bengal’s honeymoon with peace rests on an extremely fragile platform of an opportunistic alliance between the extremists and the TMC government. It might be good for the state in the short term, but has extremely harmful effects on the neighbouring states, who are trying to fight the Naxals with some earnest. While the MHA had been critical of the operational lethargy demonstrated by other states, political compulsions in West Bengal continue to make Mr Chidambaram way too patient with Ms Banerjee.
Similarly, in Chhattisgarh, security forces have gone into a self-preservation mode ever since over 100 CRPF personnel got wiped out in successive ambushes last year. A series of measures have been enforced to ensure fewer fatalities among the forces. The CRPF waits for approval from its headquarters before launching operations. The state police avoids rushing into locations of possible Maoist congregation even after tip-offs. An entirely defensive approach has replaced the euphoria and activism of Operation Green Hunt, which was launched last year and stalled after the huge losses among the security forces. A dip over 16 per cent in fatalities among the Naxals this year explains this defensive approach.
The so-called improvement in the Naxal situation is not a product of an augmentation in the capacities of the state. It has been achieved through processes of several compromises and retreat, with empowering effects on the extremist capacities. Such myopic policies can only be prolonged at the cost of making the effort to end the Naxal problem far more difficult than it is at present.
Showing posts with label naxal cpi maoist extortion india left-wing extremism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label naxal cpi maoist extortion india left-wing extremism. Show all posts
Sunday, August 14, 2011
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Red Kitty & Beyond
Business Standard, New Delhi, May 20, 2010
Just how much does the CPI-Maoist take in through its nationwide extortion? According to figures provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), it is Rs 1,400 crore annually. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh recently said that it is between Rs 1,000 and Rs 1,200 crore per year. The Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh, in November 2009, however, had said that the figure was as high as Rs 2,000 crore. The literature recovered and the confessions extracted from the arrested Naxal leaders quote different figures. The official figures, of both the MHA and state governments, are products of (often wild) guesswork. Hence, such variations are expected. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the amount the outfit manages to extract from the regions under its domination is substantial and sufficient to keep the fire of revolution burning.
Available information indicates that Jharkhand alone could be contributing Rs 300 crore, followed by Chhattisgarh, with a share of roughly Rs 150 crore. Jharkhand, in recent years, has emerged the largest contributor to the Naxal kitty. The enormous legal and illegal mining industry in the state, coupled with the huge forest produce trade amounting to crores of rupees, now forms the backbone of the so-called Red Revolution.
Other affected states, such as Bihar and Orissa, also make sizeable contributions. In each of the states, the sources contributing to the war coffer of the CPI-Maoist remain more or less the same — forest produce contractors, mining companies, road contractors, transporters and large- and small-scale industries. Money forcibly collected from individuals is comparatively meagre. Intelligence agencies say that this enormous amount of money is allowing the Naxalites to procure arms and ammunition from illegal arms bazaars of Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Interestingly, data reveals a huge disconnect between the “annual budget” of the CPI-Maoist and the money that the outfit manages to collect through its regime of large-scale extortion and intimidation. For example, Misir Besra, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in September 2007 but was snatched away to freedom less than two years later by his colleagues from the Lakhisarai court premises in Bihar, had revealed to his interrogators that the outfit had a budget of Rs 60 crore for 2007-09. Of this, Rs 42 crore was earmarked for arms, ammunition and explosives; Rs 2 crore for intelligence gathering; and the remaining Rs 16 crore for transportation, computer training, propaganda and documentation. Even Kobad Ghandy, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in New Delhi in September 2009, said that the outfit operated on a budget of Rs 15 to 20 crore.
Intelligence and police officials in different Naxal-dominated areas narrate interesting stories about how a large part of the money, collected in the name of revolution, is being misused for personal aggrandisement by the Naxal top brass. Tales can be heard about how children of Naxal leaders are pursuing careers in engineering and medicine in Indian metros while the Naxalites themselves are destroying schools of tribal children in remote areas. Such schools house security force personnel at times, but their real “crime” appears in the Maoist mind to be that they constitute evidence that gives the lie to the Naxal narrative of state neglect.
In fact, the way a large and a complex outfit like the CPI-Maoist functions, it can be safely argued that there is little scope for personal aggrandisement by insurgent top leaders. The case, however, is certainly different where criminalised fringe outfits are concerned. These, wearing Naxal colours, have mushroomed in states such as Jharkhand.
If this much is well-known, what is only beginning to emerge is the extent to which the civil administration in states like Bihar and Jharkhand is also part of a web of corruption that feeds the conflict. Questioned during a 2009 field visit, a senior Jharkhand police official observed that Block Development Officers often pay bribes to be posted to Naxal-affected districts. “There is ample money and no accountability,” noted the senior official, his point being quite clear: Illegal mining activity in Jharkhand feeds the Naxalites, bureaucrats and politicians equally.
Little effort has been made to study this aspect of a burgeoning war economy. Instead, the debate is dominated by the government’s emphasis on the regime of loot and extortion put in place by the Red Army. Yet a symbiotic relationship is at hand. For instance, contractors laying roads in the remote areas are willing to conceal explosives under the road surface on behalf of the Naxalites, because explosions targeting culverts and small bridges permanently erase evidence of poor-quality work.
As a necessary first step in dealing with the challenge, the Seventh Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended in February 2008 that a special anti-extortion and anti-money laundering cell be set up by state police/state governments. The state governments have been asked by New Delhi to prepare action plans to monitor and curb illegal mining. The use of satellite imagery and other intelligence inputs has been advised by the central government in the preparation and implementation of such action plans. Further, a Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee has been set up by the central government to ensure elimination of delays in grants of mineral concessions to reduce the scope for illegal mining.
These are necessary measures no doubt. But capacity of the states to dominate areas currently under Naxal domination is a critical prerequisite to end extortion by both the Naxalites as well as other elements. Given the current disjointed nature of the ongoing counter-Naxal operations, such a scenario looks improbable anytime soon.
Just how much does the CPI-Maoist take in through its nationwide extortion? According to figures provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), it is Rs 1,400 crore annually. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh recently said that it is between Rs 1,000 and Rs 1,200 crore per year. The Director General of Police in Chhattisgarh, in November 2009, however, had said that the figure was as high as Rs 2,000 crore. The literature recovered and the confessions extracted from the arrested Naxal leaders quote different figures. The official figures, of both the MHA and state governments, are products of (often wild) guesswork. Hence, such variations are expected. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the amount the outfit manages to extract from the regions under its domination is substantial and sufficient to keep the fire of revolution burning.
Available information indicates that Jharkhand alone could be contributing Rs 300 crore, followed by Chhattisgarh, with a share of roughly Rs 150 crore. Jharkhand, in recent years, has emerged the largest contributor to the Naxal kitty. The enormous legal and illegal mining industry in the state, coupled with the huge forest produce trade amounting to crores of rupees, now forms the backbone of the so-called Red Revolution.
Other affected states, such as Bihar and Orissa, also make sizeable contributions. In each of the states, the sources contributing to the war coffer of the CPI-Maoist remain more or less the same — forest produce contractors, mining companies, road contractors, transporters and large- and small-scale industries. Money forcibly collected from individuals is comparatively meagre. Intelligence agencies say that this enormous amount of money is allowing the Naxalites to procure arms and ammunition from illegal arms bazaars of Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Interestingly, data reveals a huge disconnect between the “annual budget” of the CPI-Maoist and the money that the outfit manages to collect through its regime of large-scale extortion and intimidation. For example, Misir Besra, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in September 2007 but was snatched away to freedom less than two years later by his colleagues from the Lakhisarai court premises in Bihar, had revealed to his interrogators that the outfit had a budget of Rs 60 crore for 2007-09. Of this, Rs 42 crore was earmarked for arms, ammunition and explosives; Rs 2 crore for intelligence gathering; and the remaining Rs 16 crore for transportation, computer training, propaganda and documentation. Even Kobad Ghandy, the CPI-Maoist politburo member who was arrested in New Delhi in September 2009, said that the outfit operated on a budget of Rs 15 to 20 crore.
Intelligence and police officials in different Naxal-dominated areas narrate interesting stories about how a large part of the money, collected in the name of revolution, is being misused for personal aggrandisement by the Naxal top brass. Tales can be heard about how children of Naxal leaders are pursuing careers in engineering and medicine in Indian metros while the Naxalites themselves are destroying schools of tribal children in remote areas. Such schools house security force personnel at times, but their real “crime” appears in the Maoist mind to be that they constitute evidence that gives the lie to the Naxal narrative of state neglect.
In fact, the way a large and a complex outfit like the CPI-Maoist functions, it can be safely argued that there is little scope for personal aggrandisement by insurgent top leaders. The case, however, is certainly different where criminalised fringe outfits are concerned. These, wearing Naxal colours, have mushroomed in states such as Jharkhand.
If this much is well-known, what is only beginning to emerge is the extent to which the civil administration in states like Bihar and Jharkhand is also part of a web of corruption that feeds the conflict. Questioned during a 2009 field visit, a senior Jharkhand police official observed that Block Development Officers often pay bribes to be posted to Naxal-affected districts. “There is ample money and no accountability,” noted the senior official, his point being quite clear: Illegal mining activity in Jharkhand feeds the Naxalites, bureaucrats and politicians equally.
Little effort has been made to study this aspect of a burgeoning war economy. Instead, the debate is dominated by the government’s emphasis on the regime of loot and extortion put in place by the Red Army. Yet a symbiotic relationship is at hand. For instance, contractors laying roads in the remote areas are willing to conceal explosives under the road surface on behalf of the Naxalites, because explosions targeting culverts and small bridges permanently erase evidence of poor-quality work.
As a necessary first step in dealing with the challenge, the Seventh Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended in February 2008 that a special anti-extortion and anti-money laundering cell be set up by state police/state governments. The state governments have been asked by New Delhi to prepare action plans to monitor and curb illegal mining. The use of satellite imagery and other intelligence inputs has been advised by the central government in the preparation and implementation of such action plans. Further, a Coordination-cum-Empowered Committee has been set up by the central government to ensure elimination of delays in grants of mineral concessions to reduce the scope for illegal mining.
These are necessary measures no doubt. But capacity of the states to dominate areas currently under Naxal domination is a critical prerequisite to end extortion by both the Naxalites as well as other elements. Given the current disjointed nature of the ongoing counter-Naxal operations, such a scenario looks improbable anytime soon.
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