Insularity was Unreal

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Pragati, 25 July 2014

Not long ago the contention that Indian Muslims have rebuffed repeated calls by Islamist outfits to join global jihad would have been accepted without much fuss. Barring handful men who got radicalised in distant shores in London and Paris, Muslim youths largely ignored calls by the al Qaeda to join the jihad against the West. However, reports that at least 18 Indians have already joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and a lone Indian of the 80-odd men who are undergoing training in Afghanistan has already martyred himself has burst the self-aggrandising bubble. The fact that some of these youths might have been radicalised outside India provides little respite. It could very well be a matter of time before discovery of many more Indians filling up the rank and file of the Islamists is made. In fact it appears that as we harped on the insularity of our Muslim youths from the turbulent world, a silent radicalisation process was consuming some of them.

Anwar Bhatkal, part of a 15-member Mujahideen team that carried out an assault on a border security post in Sohrabak district of Kandahar, died in the early hours of 18 July 2014. Anwar, who served as a driver in Dubai and also a logistic supplier for the Indian Mujahideen (IM), thus, became the first Indian to have perished fighting on behalf of the Taliban insurgency. Gul Mohammad Maraikar, hailing from Tamil Nadu and with a permanent resident status in Singapore, worked as a systems analyst for a top technology firm before being deported to India in March 2014. He was charged with radicalizing a Singapore citizen Haja Fakkurudeen Usman Ali. Before the Singaporean authorities found out, Fakkurudeen had left for Syria to fight the Bashar al-Assad regime on behalf of the ISIS.

There is seemingly little in common between Anwar Bhatkal, Maraikar, and Fakkurudeen except for their sudden decision to traverse the road to perdition by giving up normal and what would be commonly described as contented lives. Profile of the other young men who have travelled from Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerala to terrorist camps in either Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria also reveal very little in terms of why certain individuals, with lots to live for, chose to become part of a distant war. It is this inscrutability of motivation that makes the study of radicalisation an extremely challenging affair.

From India’s national security point of view, two divergent questions emerge as one pores over the available information on the journeys of these Muslim youths to the above-mentioned theatres of conflict. Firstly, whether India can take comfort from the fact that these young men are fighting essentially ‘foreign’ wars, with little direct impact on its own territory? Secondly, whether the phenomenon can be analysed within the homegrown terror framework? Answers to both questions are critical as far as India’s preparedness for keeping its homeland safe in future is concerned.

The dangers these holy fighters pose to India pertain to both near and long term. For many prospective fighters inclined to choose a similar career path, both in India and abroad, they would become ultimate examples of sacrifice and beacon lights of sorts. In India, some young men would attempt and succeed in travelling to the badlands in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Those who cant, “India, the sinful land” (as one of the youth wrote in his last letter before he left his Tamil Nadu home) itself might become a primary theatre of warfare. Many of those who have already joined terrorist ranks abroad may not survive those wars. However, if they do and manage to return to their home country, their propensity for violence and experience in participating in bloodbath would make them able pointsmen for carrying out jihad at home. Home grown terror would then attain a whole new dynamic.

There are additional associated dangers. A steady stream of Indian Muslim youths joining the jihadi rank and file would make Indian Muslim youths in general suspects in the eyes of the security and intelligence establishment at home as well as abroad. Singling them out for interrogation or ill treatment meted to them in public places would further alienate them from the mainstream, creating thereby a wave of disenchantment, which can be exploited by the terrorist outfits. One can be thus sure that outfits like the IM / Ansar ul-Tawhid, ISIS, and the al Qaeda would henceforth highlight each death of an Indian jihadist as a supreme sacrifice worth emulating.

Late Anwar Bhatkal and many other IM cadres, training in the Af-Pak region, are part of the IM initiative of consolidating its position in global jihad. While India remains its primary target, IM’s inclination to emerge as a messiah of the Muslims worldwide started long back. Explosions targeting Buddhist places of pilgrimage and plans to target western tourists in India were part of this game plan. Such a strategy serves purposes of its expansion, keeps a check on its internal divisions, and also helps it establishing close operational relationship with the al Qaeda and other outfits, with the hope that the latter would be obliged to wage a common war on India in future. Should IM manage to survive and carry out its violent campaigns for few more years, it may emerge as the fountainhead of Jihad directed against India. It is in this context that both the outward journey of Indian Muslim youths to Iraq, Syria an Afghanistan and their future return to their home country must be analysed.

Unfortunately there isn’t much that the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies can do to make the youth who have already left Indian shores return and resume normal lives. Similarly, little can be done if some Indian expatriates, among the millions who have made several Gulf countries home, continue to fill in the ranks of the ISIS or the Taliban. However, measures can be put in place to prevent their return to India as well as preventing a direct influx of youths from India into global jihad.

Unlike several countries affected by terrorism, de-radicalisation remains an unknown concept in India. This is especially astounding in view of the extent to which home grown Islamist militancy has tormented the country over the past years. According to media reports a wave of radicalisation is currently sweeping through Kashmir and in response, a meek Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) proposal to set up a committee to prevent radicalisation of youth in the state under a senior joint secretary is on the anvil. The country needs to do much more and at a much faster pace. Since the bubble of insularity has already been burst, accepting the wide impact of radicalisation on our Muslim youths, can be the starting point.

http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2014/07/insularity-was-unreal/

A 'New' Counter-Naxal Action Plan

Bibhu Prasad Routray

IPCS Article No. 4572, 21 July 2014

Days after the formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in New Delhi, contours of a new policy vis-a-vis Left Wing Extremism (LWE) remained a matter of speculation. Whether tough measures would replace the ad hoc ones and clarity would substitute confusion were commented upon. Some of the statements of the Home Minister and the Ministry officials in the early days following the formation of the government raised hopes that a policy change, if not the prospect of an immediate solution to the problem could be on the anvil. However, the new 29-point Action Plan evolved by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for addressing the LWE challenge point towards the continuation of the past policies and does not indicate a radical departure from the approach pursued by the previous government.

Three principal assumptions mark the new counter-LWE policy:

a. Security force operations must precede developmental initiatives

b. The Communist Party of India-Maoist’s (CPI-Maoist) military capacities can be crippled by targeting its top leadership

c. Security force operations, with modest gains so far can be made effective by additional force deployment and augmenting intelligence collection.

While each of these assumptions are relevant, whether such measures can be implemented without broad-based security and governance sector reforms, remains a matter of debate.

Ruling out negotiations with the CPI-Maoist has been one of the most highlighted aspects of Home Minister Rajnath Singh's statements in recent times. Speaking on 27 June, Singh, at the meeting of chief secretaries and Directors General of Police (DGPs) of 10 Naxal-affected states said, “There is no question of any talks now. We will take a balanced approach. But the forces will give a befitting reply if the Naxals launch attacks.” Given that several past offers for negotiations have been rebuffed by the CPI-Maoist, Singh's statement aims to serve as a foundation for a primarily force-based approach to the LWE challenge.

The new action plan involves a directive to the Intelligence Bureau to “infiltrate into Maoist ranks” and follow a specific policy of targeting the top leadership for neutralisation. The Naxal-affected states have been advised to raise commando forces similar to the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh. Similarly, 10 additional battalions of central armed police personnel are being deployed in Chattisgarh’s Bastar region by the end of 2014 for a renewed offensive against the extremists. The new policy further speaks of creating a series of incentives for “good officers” to serve in Maoist-affected areas by offering them monetary incentives and career benefits.

All these measures, incidentally, have remained the MHA's counter-LWE approach in the past. None, however, achieved much success due to a range of deficiencies that include lack of ability as well as coordination between the central as well as state security forces and the intelligence agencies. Years since the LWE emerged as a major security threat to the country, both technical intelligence (TECHINT) as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering mechanisms continue to suffer from serious shortcomings. There is an acute lack of enthusiastic participation of the state police forces in New Delhi’s overall design, that neither supplements nor aims to replace the central forces in countering the extremists. The new plan is silent on the ways to remove such loopholes and make operations a principally state police-led initiative. Given the fact that state bureaucracy has remained mostly apathetic to restart governance in areas cleared by the security forces, policies need to go beyond the rhetoric of 'posting of good officers' in naxal-affected areas.

In the previous years, evolving a national policy consensus on a challenge that affects at least 10 states has remained one of the main challenges for New Delhi. The 29-point Action Plan falls short of addressing the problem. It merely exhorts the affected states to appoint nodal officers to increase coordination at the centre and asks the chief ministers and home ministers to visit the affected areas in their respective states to develop a favourable image of the government among the tribal population. In the absence of a reward system to make the non-conforming states fall in line with a central approach, such measures of improving coordination are likely to be met with lack of enthusiasm, if not resistance by the states ruled by non-Bharatiya Janata Party parties.

The current LWE situation is marked by scaled down violence by the extremists who understandably are into a consolidation mode after suffering some reversals. Recruitment activities still continue, so do the efforts to ideologically reshape the movement that seems to have deviated significantly from its original objectives and strategies. A tactical retreat of this nature often creates the illusion of victory among the policy makers. At the same time, low level violence creates significant opportunities for the government to revisit its own strategies, make inroads into the extremist areas, and prepare for future escalations. Whether the MHA would use the time well is something to watch out for.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/a-new-counter-naxal-action-plan-4572.html

Modification Hopes: India Reviews its national security Policies

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Jane's Intelligence Review, July 2014, page- 40-45

Key Points:

• The new Indian government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi will implement a security policy that differs from its predecessor, in which relations with Pakistan will be targeted on several fronts, but the changes are likely to be cosmetic rather than substantive.
• The country’s inability to deal with insurgent and separatist movements is rooted in fundamental problems with governance, leadership, intelligence generation, and force mobilisation – a situation that will not change in the coming two to three years.
• Rapid movement towards establishing an alternative anti-terrorism architecture is unlikely, and indeed co-operation between the central and state governments on security issues may even worsen.

Full Article in www.ihs.com/janes

India–Pakistan Peace Process Intent and Incapacity Paradox

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, vol.1, no.1, pp.79-105

Abstract

Attempts to stay engaged in a process of sustained dialogue and achieve incremental progress towards peace by the Indian and Pakistani political leadership suffered another setback in the form of cross-border firing and allegations of ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and the international boundary in 2013. While New Delhi’s Congress party-led regime, facing parliamentary elections in 2014, buckled under pressure from an intrusive media and the opposition political parties, the new civilian government in Islamabad, in its edgy relationship with the country’s powerful military, put the peace project in the back burner. As allegations and counter charges flew, incapacities of both countries to bring the situation under control were reinforced. The article uses this case study to assess the intent of as well as limitations on leadership of both countries for staying engaged in a process of dialogue. Not just their commitment to peace, but the ability to defy the limitations would shape the future of Indo–Pak relations, the article argues.

http://aia.sagepub.com/content/1/1/79.short

Naxal Violence: Old Challenges for the New Government

Bibhu Prasad Routray

IPCS Article No. 4395, 21 April 2014

That the Communist Party of India-Maoist (Maoist) does not believe in democratic principles and electoral processes is too well known. The 2014 Lok Sabha elections provided the extremist outfit with yet another opportunity to reassert its vision for the country. In words and as well as with accompanied violence, it proved once more that the probability of a negotiated settlement to the long-standing conflict is rather low.

The CPI-Maoist released three sets of somewhat contradictory statements in March 2014, two signed by the spokesperson of the outfit's Central Committee (CC) and one on behalf of the outfit's Eastern Regional Bureau. Dated 24 March, the CC released its customary boycott of elections calling the affair "another huge financial burden on the people", which can not transform the "present exploitative system." Critiquing all the political parties for their dishonest policies towards the tribals, the statement termed the government's peace proposals "deceptive."

Interestingly, another 19-page document was released by the CC on the same day, which contained answers to 11 questions posed by the media persons to the outfit. Responding to a question on the outlook of the outfit on peace talks with the government, the spokesperson stated that while the outfit is "not against Peace Talks with the government", since talks are "an integral part of the political struggle." However, five demands were outlined which the government must fulfil before a peace process could begin. These included declaring the CPI-Maoist a political movement; de-proscribing the outfit and its front organisations; initiating judicial inquiries into the killings of its senior leaders; stopping of security force operations; and releasing arrested leaders/cadres of the outfit.

The statement surprisingly was hailed as the outfit's declaration for peace by the media, ignoring the fact that the conditions outlined have remained an integral part of the outfit's statements in the past. While the outfit expects the government to fulfil some of its most impious demands, the outfit itself has rebuffed the minimum condition laid down by the home ministry to "stop violence for 72 hours" as the lone condition for starting of a peace process.

Few days prior to the release of the twin CC statements, the CPI-Maoist's Eastern Regional Bureau had issued a four-page 'short-term vision document' appealing the masses to chose between "real democracy" or a "pseudo-democratic system." This document, which effectively constituted a manifesto of the outfit, reiterated the need for a "new constitution" including provisions for "equal socio-economic rights to women" and "death penalty compulsory for molestation and rape." It further called for "freedom of speech and expression, right to congregate and protest, form an organisation, primary health care, access to primary education, primary and minimum employment and compulsory participation in daily governance system." The outfit additionally promised not to suppress the separatist movements with the power of the gun, but to "honour nationalist movements and self-decision to allow them dignified and peaceful co-existence (sic)."

Neither the proclamation of intent for peace nor the declaration of its own manifesto, however, stopped the outfit from carrying out a series of attacks on security force personnel, poll officials as well as civilians in the affected states that went to polls. Compared to the 2009 Lok Sabha polls, during which 19 people were killed by the outfit, till the writing of the article, at least 20 civilians and security forces had been killed in Maoist attacks. 

These contrasting signals emanating from the outfit signify two possibilities. One, peace negotiation as an instrument of conflict resolution does not figure in the imagination of the extremist outfit and its utterances on a peace process are merely rhetorical. Two, the outfit intends to use violence as a bargaining tool in case a peace process with the government comes to fruition.

Faced with this deceptive extremist strategy, the action plans of the political class to deal with the challenge, remains highly fractured. Going by the manifestos of the political parties, the probability that the new government in New Delhi would be able to address the anomalies of the past and chart a new course looks blurry.

While the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) promise to deal with the problem with a "firm hand" and a policy of "zero tolerance" respectively, the Aam Admi Party (AAP) prefers a "multi-lateral dialogue." The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) opines in favour of "specific measures to tackle the socio-economic problems" faced "particularly by the tribal people." The BJP insists that "talks with the insurgent groups will be conditional and within the framework of the constitution." The Congress, on the other hand, is silent on the process of dialogue and prefers to pursue "a development agenda to empower people" in the affected areas. While the CPI-M insists that left-wing extremism is "not just a security issue," the AAP reiterates that "socio-economic development and effective political de-centralisation" hold the key.

A project that attempts to reconcile these stark differences is not only difficult, but is likely to produce a compromised and ineffective policy. Thus, in all probability, left-wing extremism will continue to be a challenge, inhibiting growth, development and governance, in the foreseeable future.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxal-violence-old-challenges-for-the-new-government-4395.html

Reproduced in Eurasia Review

Book Review: FIGHTING BACK: WHAT GOVERNMENTS CAN DO ABOUT TERRORISM by Paul Shemella

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Book Review India, Volume 38, Number 4, April 2014

What does it take to win a war? Leadership, soldiers, strategy, weapons or finance? What explains the inadequate accomplishments of the states, some with enormous resources at their disposal, vis-a-vis terrorism? Are we confronting an enemy which simply can't be defeated? Or philosophically speaking, are we, with an aim of defeating terrorism, merely fighting against ourselves, trying to overcome our inadequacies? Post-2001 period has seen a wave of literature on terrorism and its associated evils. And while most claim to know the reason of our failures, few seem to have a clue to achieving success.

Fighting Back, in the words of its editor, is a product of a modest search for a textbook that presents a dynamic, acquired knowledge about how governments can respond to terrorism. It aimed to achieve two purposes. Firstly, a limited one, to serve as a textbook in the 'Civil-military responses to terrorism' seminars of the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey. And secondly, to broadly help the US government officials develop the best means to help other governments develop the capacity to fight terrorism successfully. While the first of the twin objectives appears to have been fulfilled, it is not clear whether the counter-terror policy of the United States has been influenced to any extent by the words of wisdom contained in this 400-pages book. States operate strangely and none knows how their policies are framed.

From the surface, this book appears as one that prescribes a hardcore approach to mitigating terrorism within the civil-military cooperation paradigm. Chapters in the first two of the three sections of the book suggest ways to target terrorist networks, terrorist financing, cyber terrorism, maritime terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. They also prescribe ways to build effective counter terrorism institutions, establish inter-agency decision-making, and adopting the right tools and strategies for combating terrorism. At the same time, the book also speaks other soft approaches of fighting terror – taking for example the image of an onion whose terrorism 'core' must not smashed to pulp along with the entire onion, but how the layers, the moral resources of the civil society, must be mobilized to isolate the core. Editor Paul Shemella writes in the chapter on 'Defusing Terrorist Ideology', "Anyone attempting to counter ideological support for terrorism must realize that such efforts can succeed only from within the ideological community itself."

That, in a way, makes this an off-beat book, rebelling against the common refrain “desperate times call for desperate measures” that dominated the post-9/11 world. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the United States was "at war" with terrorism. Since then, numerous scholars have been at pains explaining both Powell's mistake as well as his actual intentions. The book does right to clarify, "The so called war on terrorism is not a war at all, it is a political context that can be won only at the political level." Perhaps two additional chapters on terrorist recruitment and de-radicalization were needed to set the debate on a firm footing in favour of a balanced approach to fighting terrorism. Also necessary was a chapter on the definitional aspects of terrorism, to supplement the existing attempts to initiate a debate on terminologies such as Islamic, Islamist, Jihadi, Islamo-fascist, and Salafist terrorism.   

The third section of the book that deals with six case studies is probably its weakest link, not so much for the lack of scholarship, but due to the enormous amount of information these need to present within a limited space. However, even within these limitations the chapters do make important points on the inadequacies of state institutions in responding to terror incidents. For example, "pointing at the lack of inter agency cooperation" the chapter on the Mumbai terrorist attacks says "the terrorist attacks on Mumbai need not have occurred at all." Similarly, the Madrid train bombing chapter points at Spain's "inept crisis management" as the government went on an overdrive to blame the Basque separatist organisation, the ETA, even as the blasts bore unambiguous signs of an Islamist terror. This chapter, in particular, goes beyond the usual brief of analysing the attacks to include an excellent summary of the processes of radicalization of the involved terrorists.      

Building international consensus against terrorism has continued to remain one of the key problems of fighting the menace. The book in its conclusion notes, "no government has the capacity to develop and execute successful strategies on its own; generating them will require allies, regional partners, and friends to assist one another in building the robust institutions needed to pursue long term campaigns against terrorism in all its forms."

It took five years following the 9/11 attacks to adopt the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy at the United Nations. Even then, individual countries promoting terror against others continue to escape international attention and sanctions. Apart from the failed states which invariably turn into terrorist safe houses and launch pads, the deliberate strategy of using terror as an instrument of state policy is wreaking havoc in many parts of the world including South Asia. And yet, these very countries continue to be partners of the United States in the global war on terror. It is difficult to foretell an end to terrorism under such circumstances.

The editor writes, "It may not be possible to rid the world of terrorism as a tactic for extremists, but democratic governments are obliged to do whatever they can to protect their citizens." Terrorism as a threat to nation states will continue for foreseeable future, so also the need to evolve responses to meet the challenges. Each passing year and each terror attack would bring in new techniques of sabotage underlining the need to evolve new ways of meeting the threat. And yet, in this ever-expanding and evolving threat-response paradigm, certain principles would remain unchanged. For all times, success of countries against terrorism would remain directly linked to their combined and networked capacities to manage discontent. The extent of responsiveness ingrained to the principles of governance would be the hallmark of any success against terrorism. Paradoxically, even with these investments – intellectual as well as financial –  terrorism would not disappear, but would certainly lose its attractiveness as a career option for a large number of men continue to swell the terrorist ranks.

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-2983/2014/april/4/addressing-a-complex-issue.html

Combating Naxal Violence: Transient and Permanent Success

Bibhu Prasad Routray

IPCS Article No. 4341, 17 March 2014

Would the Maoists continue to carry out intermittent attacks targetting the state in the foreseeable future? Or would they eventually disintegrate and disappear owing to a leadership crisis because the state has been able to neutralise some of their top leaders while the remaining are too old for a continuous fight? The answers would shape the response to what has been the most potent case of extremism in India.

Commentary on the activities of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has been in a state of flux in recent years. Commentators have shifted their positions along with incidents and with rising or diminishing death tolls. Two recent instances can be cited. Neutralisation of seven Maoists in Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra on 17 February, for instance, underlined that advancement of the state and weakening of the Maoists. However, following two Maoist attacks within a fortnight in Chhattisgarh that killed 20 security force personnel in February and March 2014 in Dantewada and Suka districts, the narrative shifted and the potency of the extremists was reconfirmed. The Maoists, who appeared to have previously weakened, have resurfaced as a real threat to the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in certain states.

Much of these fluctuations in analyses owe their origin to the states’ claims of success against the extremists. There is no denying the fact that the security forces have indeed made some advances in the Maoist-affected theatres. The most usual parameter to judge this is the dip in violence in recent years. Compared to 2010, when 1,005 civilians and security forces were killed in extremist attacks, 394 deaths occurred in 2013. Additionally, combined with figures of killings of Maoist cadres, the number of surrenders as well as occasional confirmations from the outfit, the CPI-Maoist's capacity to orchestrate violence has been interpreted as having declined.

If these conclusions are true, how does one interpret the 28 February and 11 March attacks in Chhattisgarh? Are these attacks only aberrations and constitute desperate attempts by the extremists to reiterate their presence, more so before the elections? Or do they indicate that the success of the state was more of a tactical favour granted by the extremists and hence, the lull in violence was merely temporary?

While the assertion that Maoists have indeed killed less civilians and security forces in recent years is sustainable, whether this decline in extremist violence is demonstrative of augmented capacities of the state remains a relevant question. With particular reference to the 11 March attack, the security force establishment has argued in defence of the ambushed Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) team, vouching for its bravery. While some arguments have tried to locate Maoist successes in the violation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) by the security force personnel, the CRPF chief has stated that SOPs are not sacrosanct and can be improvised if situations demand. Similarly, criticisms regarding lack of intelligence and coordination between the central and the state police have all been rebuffed.

If all is well with the mode of operations, why are the security forces regularly falling prey to attacks by a so called weak and demoralised extremist outfit? The answer to this seemingly complicated question is relatively simple. The state, with all its instrumentalities of power, has failed to dominate the extremism-affected territory under question. Blame it either on the lack of adequate strength of security force personnel or a cohesive strategy to dislodge the extremists, the fact remains that much of the territory which report incidents of violence continues to remain under the grip of the extremists.

Either the state's success of neutralising key Maoist leaders through encounters, arrests and surrenders or its inflicting of losses through disruption of means of communication and logistics has not enlarged its writ into the ungoverned territories. As a result, security force raids into extremist-held territories, while making impressive media headlines, have not converted those areas into state-only areas. The lack of a strategy to gradually expand the state's domination is also the reason why the development initiatives of the state have failed to win over the tribals. One cannot expect to have loyalists in areas that are controlled by one’s adversary. And in such areas under extremist domination, the losses undergone by the outfit are recovered fairly rapidly. This is precisely the reason why the statement of the Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde that the state will ‘take revenge’ for the 11 March attack in Chhattisgarh appears hollow.

A few hours after the 11 March attack, a social network page, ostensibly supportive of the extremists, uploaded a picture of a bloodied Indian map along with a gun totting rebel. "Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed," Mao Zedong's famous line, was scribbled across the picture. The picture is a pointer towards the future. The Maoist war against the state, as long as it lasts, will be bloody. The least that the state can do is to embark upon a strategy to ensure that the areas in which the Maoists launch these bloody wars are shrunk on a gradual basis.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/combating-naxal-violence-transient-and-permanent-success-4341.html

Why the government's anti-Naxal response is a failure

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Rediff, 12 March 2014

There have been two attacks by the Communist Party of India-Maoist within a fortnight in Chhattisgarh, the worst left-wing extremism affected state in the country. While five security force personnel were killed in the February 28 attack in Dantewada district, 16 people including 11 belonging to the Central Reserve Police Force, four belonging to the state police and a civilian were killed on March 11 in Sukma district.

With the Lok Sabha elections beginning in less than a month, these attacks would be linked to extremist intent to escalate violence and demonstrate an ideological opposition to the political process in the country. The fact remains, however, that success of the extremists to carry out such attacks and failure of the state to prevent them underline a much deeper malaise.

Available reports indicate that a large number of Maoists (estimates ranging from 100 to 300) attacked the security force personnel, part of a 45-member security team deployed to provide security to the road construction work on National Highway 30 that connects the state capital Raipur to Sukma. Naxals surrounded the team from both sides and fired indiscriminately. Within 15 minutes, the team had been overpowered and the Naxals managed to carry away weapons and ammunition from the dead and the injured.

Coming 10 months after the May 2013 attack in Darbha in which 27 people including Congress party leaders and workers were killed, this constitutes a major achievement for the extremists.  

Like any counter-insurgency operations, success in anti-Naxal operations need to fulfil certain policy, strategic and tactical requirements. The strategies must be formulated by the security experts and not by the political class and the detached bureaucracy. The operations must remain a small commander's war, an effort in which the state police establishment takes the lead and the central police forces pitch in to provide necessary support.

The personnel involved in the sustained operations need to be led intelligently and must have access to ground level intelligence, quality arms and other logistics. The political class must limit itself to provide broad policy directions and demonstrate a steadfast intent to solve the problem and keep it undiluted from partisan considerations.

It would appear that in spite of a decade-long history of counter-Naxal operations in the country (taking the 2004 formation of the CPI-Maoist as a cut off year), none of these basic requirements have been fulfilled in any of the conflict theatres. Under the circumstances, while a dip in violence may be achieved as a result of a tactical favour granted by the extremists, a victory is unimaginable.

Calling the Chhattisgarh police a completely divided force may be a little too sweeping. However, the fact remains that the recent times have witnessed rivalry and unhealthy competition affecting group solidarity, a key component in counter-insurgency theatres. Senior IPS officers in the state have squabbled bitterly laying claims to the post of director general of police in the past months, after the incumbent DGP retired in January 2014.

Intelligence gathering capacities of the police have been questioned by the senior police officers. A senior police official has accused an ADG and DIG in charge of the state's intelligence branch of turning it into a personal fiefdom and thereby seriously affecting its operations. 

Such divisions merely accentuates to the existing capacity crunch. Data reveals that Chhattisgarh has a police density of 31.8 policemen per 100 square kilometres, amounting to roughly a lone policeman managing three square kilometre area. In the inaccessible and remote Bastar division, police presence is expected to be even poorer. In comparison, in terms of sheer numerical strength, other Naxal-affected states like Bihar have a density of 70.8 and Jharkhand 71.5.

Chhattisgarh has managed to improve its total police strength from 23,350 in 2005 to 42,975 in 2012. However, even this near doubling up is clearly not enough. Bihar and Jharkhand with much less geographical area have much larger police force.

In addition, in Chhattisgarh over 26 percent vacancy exists in the SSP/SP/deputy SP level and another 21 percent in the inspector/sub-inspector level demonstrating an acute shortage of officers both at the leadership as well as operational level. To expect such a weak, depleted and demoralised police force to lead the anti-Naxal operations and emerge victorious is inconceivable.

Not surprisingly a Chhattisgarh senior police officer summed up, "We have effectively outsourced the counter-Naxal operations to the central forces." With the central forces, duty bound to play the role of a supporter or force enabler and certainly not that of a lead force, the fight against the Naxals is marked by enormous confusion and operational frailty.

The recent attacks are as much a failure of the state government as that of New Delhi. In spite of the chronic problem, responses to Naxal attacks are yet to emerge from the realm of politics, with New Delhi blaming Raipur and the latter returning the favour. Following the May 2013 attacks in Darbha, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh blamed "raajnaitik matbhed" (political differences) pointing at a deliberate decision on part of Bharatiya Janata Party-ruled Raipur not to provide security to his party leaders.

While Singh issued a customary statement underlining his resolve to bring the culprits to book, his Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde chose to continue with his holidays in the United States and not return to the country till a week after the incident. The country's response to Naxalism remains dishonest, to say the least. It is astonishing that in spite of his repeated pronouncements regarding the severity of the problem over the past decade, Dr Singh has failed to give any direction to the much touted anti-Naxal endeavours.

All Naxal-affected states demonstrate similar police as well as governance incapacities. Odd occasions of success and temporary dip in Naxal violence notwithstanding, the states have utterly failed to dominate and make their presence felt over areas under the extremist domination.

Similar to the November 2013 assembly elections in Chhattisgarh, deployment of a large number of security forces may be able to minimise extremist violence during the upcoming elections. However, securing a victory against the Naxals, unless the current force and governance dispositions are drastically altered by the new government in New Delhi, would remain a far-fetched dream.

http://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-the-governments-anti-naxal-response-is-a-failure/20140312.htm

Your soldiers, our soldiers

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Pragati, 7 March 2014

In July 2013, a commander of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) asserted that the fighting army of the outfit he represents has a definite edge over the security forces. He said, “Our honesty, dedication and selflessness, coupled with public support, have kept us firm and strong over the years.” Maoist literature is replete with such affirmations. While such statements are mostly rhetorical, typical of an extremist movement trying to assert moral superiority vis-a-vis its adversaries, these do contain some truths. At least in terms of attachment to an objective, the extremists are much ahead of the security forces who are merely to trying to prevent an end game.

To begin with, the country’s political leaders had less faith in the security forces. In his address at the Chief Minister’s Conference of Internal Security in New Delhi on 20 December 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, “Inadequate, ill-equipped, ill-trained, poorly-motivated personnel cannot take on Naxalite extremists who are increasingly getting better equipped and organised.” In the next six years, enormous resources were spent to create a force that can discard these loopholes. The country continues to incur such expenses in modernisation programmes.

Improvements, as a result, have been achieved in terms of amassing a large contingent of fighting men, building on their capacities, and also the equipments in their possession. The days when the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) used to admit that the insurgents are better armed than the state police force personnel are far behind. Most of the police posts today are much better protected and are no longer sitting ducks they used to be half a decade back. While a large scope for improvement in the operating standards remains, the security forces combating the Maoists are much better dressed, fed, and equipped today than earlier.

Contrast this imagery of a security force personnel with that of a Maoist. In spite of the reports of the CPI-Maoist collecting millions of rupees as extortion and establishing arms smuggling networks through India’s northeast, living conditions of an average rebel has not undergone any improvement over the years. His/ her life is constantly on the run with access to the most basic diet just enough to survive and to crude weapons (only the senior cadres have access to sophisticated weapons) for purposes of inflicting fatalities on the enemy as well as self-defence. It is apparent from the descriptions of the media persons who have spent time in Maoist camps that with the state’s military approach gathering steam, such operating conditions have become even more precarious and inhospitable.

While one can go on debating the way the CPI-Maoist has been able to transform the cadres recruited through a range of methods into die hard revolutionaries, the fact remains that the steadfast attachment to an end game invariably differentiates the extremists from the security force personnel. While doubting the gallantry quotient among the security forces is none of the purposes of this article, the reality is that the left-wing extremism affected theatres of the country, much like the insurgency-affected states of the Northeast, are marked by a contest between resolute attachment to an ideology and personal bravery. Somehow, the rigorous training modules and expenses on firearms incurred on the security forces have not been able to bridge the crucial gap between competency and commitment.

Data on desertion among the security forces and surrender of Maoist cadres provide a useful, albeit not the most ideal, empirical evidence for this argument. Between 2009 and 2012, central police organisations like the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) lost 36,618 personnel to resignations and voluntary retirement. In 2013, another 8,500 personnel left their services. Experts attribute such mass-scale attrition to reasons such as stress, continued deployment in conflict zones and absence of peace time postings; hostile operating environments; and lack of basic facilities.

In comparison, 1533 Maoist cadres surrendered between 2009 and 2013. Some attributed their decisions to an ideological disconnect, some to ill health and some others to the hardships in the forests. Even considering the fact that not all the resigning security force personnel were deployed in Maoist affected areas and also that the total strength of the paramilitary forces is several multiples of the number of the Maoists, the retiree/ surrendered personnel to total force ratio is alarmingly higher among the security forces than the extremists. In simple terms, in spite of much worse operational conditions, most Maoists chose to remain with the outfit.

While several factors lie at the root of the “trend of attrition” among the security forces, three prominent ones are worth mentioning. One, there is a persisting command and control problem with the security forces, exemplified by forces being led during operations by less qualified commanders which result in operational goof ups. Second, in the absence of a national policy on extremism, force operations resemble a blow hot and blow cold engagement, inducting a sense of bewilderment among the soldiers regarding the nature of the adversary. And thirdly, in spite of their value to the government’s endeavours in the extremist affected areas, the forces continue to be treated as fully expendable. Stories of families of slain security force personnel being treated shabbily by the government are by no means infrequent. When national unity is still a contested notion, dying or getting maimed for a seemingly incomprehensible cause could be a completely worthless affair to these men in uniform. The extent to which recent proposals such as stationing security force personnel in the propinquity of their families during their entire career can address such serious operational anomalies is debatable.

Among the state’s several inherent advantages over the extremists, enormous resources are the key to ensure that there is never a shortage of fighting men. Hardly anybody anticipates a Maoist takeover of India. Over the past couple of years, fatalities in the Maoist theatre have been reduced. And yet an outright victory over the extremists remains a difficult proposition. This means that significant stretches of the country would remain no go areas for the state agencies. Under the circumstances, implementing a strategy of gradual expansion of state control through force domination and administrative penetration, through the efforts of these poorly motivated security forces, would be excruciatingly sluggish, if not unachievable.

http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2014/03/your-soldiers-our-soldiers/

Republished in Eurasia Review

India's internal wars: counterinsurgency role of central police forces

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol.24, No.4, 2013, pages: 648-68

Abstract

The continued incapacity of the central police forces remains an important reason behind persistent failures of India to deal with the challenge posed by violent extremists. Despite past successes, police-led counterinsurgency responses in the country's internal wars remain riddled with problems. Years of experience in being deployed in conflict-affected areas and considerable numerical strength notwithstanding, the central police forces have failed to emerge as able security providers. Decades of neglect, a slow modernisation process, a vacuum in leadership, and recurrent command and control problems continue to hamper building the country's counterterrorism architecture around these men in uniform.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2013.857937?journalCode=fswi20#.UxPn1vmSySp